



# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### **WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

No 4, April 1988

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# Soviet Union

## WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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[The following is a translation of the Russian-language monthly journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZH-DU-NARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

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## WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

### English Summaries of Major Articles

18160008a Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 4, Apr 88 pp 158-159

[Text] "The United Nations and Renovation of the World." The journal publishes an interview with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Petrovsky who answered some questions touching upon the key problems of the world community, discussed during the 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly. Petrovsky notes its renovated style and methods of work. He confirms that the idea of a comprehensive system of international security, advanced at the 27th CPSU Congress has won backing from many states. The socialist countries were active co-authors. Petrovsky explains the motives for voting on the resolution on the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security and the adoption of negative resolution on Afghanistan and Kampuchea despite the policy of national reconciliation being carried out by their governments. The author concretizes in conformity with Soviet diplomacy in the UN the point in M. Gorbachev's report "October and Perestroika: the Revolution Continues" that the Soviet Union has not always responded adequately to imperialist provocations in the past what often resulted into international crises. Deputy Minister was asked about the reaction of the world community to the idea of setting up a world consultative council under UN auspices to bring together the world's intellectual elite. He doesn't believe it to be correct to consider the UN as a certain "embryo" of the "world government" to come. Petrovsky is against counterposing the "diplomacy of declarations and resolutions" to the "diplomacy of negotiations".

"Deep Reduction of Strategic Weapons" by A. Arbatov. The first in a series of articles elucidates the key problems of the USSR and USA talks on the reduction of the strategic offensive arms by 50 percent. The author focuses on the need to observe the ABM Treaty and not to withdraw from it for a specified period of time. He also analyzes the perspectives of complete elimination of strategic arms and the disarmament and security problem connected with it. The author centers on the main aspects of the Treaty also in the context of strengthening military and strategic balance of stability at lower levels of nuclear arsenals. The author believes that in connection with the consideration of such far from simple problems, it is apparently high time to start an open discussion of certain urgent methodological problems. The profound perestroika of the Soviet foreign policy, its dynamics is particularly perceptible in disarmament and presupposes differing points of view, divergence of opinions, constructive discussions, the urgent problems of disarmament, security and the military adequacy included. The author also believes that the urgency and constructiveness of the declared aims are quite evident,

but the grandeur, multiprongedness and complexity of the task examined by the author is still more perceptible within the military-strategic and military-technological context.

The article "New Thinking in Relations between Communists and Social Democrats" by Yu. Krasin is based on the author's report delivered at the joint theoretical seminar at the end of 1987 of the Social-democratic party of Finland and the CPSU on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and of Finland's independence. The author focuses on the fact that in the present conditions new approaches to cooperation between communists and social democrats are needed and are quite possible. Such approaches are gradually shaping due to new political thinking on the basis of new forms of intercourse and dialogue. It is necessary to ponder over the historical fates of the working-class movement, the cooperation within it of the two main trends: the communist and social democratic. The author notes that the working-class movement which has played a significant role in the social transformations of the 20th century cannot stand aside of the problem of war and peace as well as other global problems of common concern such as the environment, insufficiency of natural and power resources, famine, the developing countries' economical and cultural backwardness, the problem of adjustment of man to the drastically changed conditions of life. The crisis which humanity survives is deep-rooted. It affects the main principles of civilization and can be overcome by the joint efforts of the intellectual and social forces of the entire community. The author points out that there still remain differences between the two trends, primarily in ideology. But under present conditions the interests of the working-class movement demand a removal of these differences. Today there exist all prerequisites for rapprochement of the stand and unity of actions between the communists and social democrats. Such a cooperation would successfully solve the urgent problems of today and place the working-class movement at the head of the struggle. The culture of dialogue of the two trends in the working class movement should be raised to the level of historical responsibility for the solution of unprecedented problems, facing humanity at the threshold of the 20th century. The culture of dialogue instils hopes that irrespective of the depth of disagreement cooperation of the two trends in the working-class movement, which have been divided for some time, is nevertheless possible.

S. Zhukov in the article "Services and Economic Growth in the Developing Countries" gives a detailed analysis of the key role and place of services in the social-economic development of the newly independent countries. The author, while examining the evolution of the structure of production, employment, and fixed capital utilization comes to the conclusion that the tertiary sector has become an important motive power of economic dynamics in the periphery zone of the world capitalist economy. At the same time the trend of giving greater importance

to services paves its way irrespective of the size of the country, the level and type of its development and the intensity with which the country is participating in the world economy. The author notes that the servicization of the developing countries' economy is a repercussion of production to the changes in urgent social demands. Powerful impulses on the part of production and consumption while strengthening and complementing one another have produced a high demand on, practically, all known forms and methods of service and have stimulated the emergence of hitherto unknown ones. The author points out that at the same time not only modern but traditional and all kinds of transitional socio-economic forms are developing and reflecting the multi-structural character of the economy and society in the tertiary sector, as well as in all other subdivisions of the economy.

Materials of the round-table discussion on the topic "India and China: Two Civilizations—Two Models of Development" are beginning to be published by the journal. The scientific and theoretical seminar of the department of economy and policy of the developing countries of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences was dedicated to this theme. China and India are two social structures which are today subjected to an active process of modernization. Being of different socio-political orientation they are rendering an ever growing impact on the world community, particularly on the developing countries. During an exchange of views general characteristics of the Indian and Chinese civilizations was given, peculiarities of their formation development were revealed and the two countries' process of modernization and its results were considered. An attempt was made to define India's and China's trend and perspectives of their development, their role in the present-day world. The scientists arrived at the conclusion about the deep inner stability of the two civilizations, of their peculiar socio-cultural homeostasis. India and China on the whole manifest themselves in the present world as civilizations with vital capacities and as models of development. Although they have taken different paths both of them undoubtedly have a perspective.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya," 1988

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#### **UN Disarmament Recommendations Help Negotiating Process**

18160008b Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 4, Apr 88 pp 3-9

[Interview with Doctor of Historical Sciences V.F. Petrovskiy, deputy USSR foreign minister: "The United Nations and the Renovation of the World"]

[Text] [Question] In your interview with PRAVDA of 13 January this year you termed the General Assembly 42d

Session a "pivotal event in the life of the United Nations". Yet the resolution on the creation of an all-embracing system of international security fared considerably less well at this session than at the preceding one (76 votes in favor, 63 abstentions and 12 against). What did those who abstained and who voted against give as the reason for their position? Another question arises also: why has the policy of national reconciliation pursued by the governments of Afghanistan and Cambodia, which would seem to be encountering a degree of understanding in other countries, failed completely to exert a positive influence on the outcome of the voting on the corresponding resolutions?

[Answer] The description of the General Assembly 42d Session as a pivotal event means primarily that it initiated the process of renovation of the content, methods and style of work of the United Nations. The gravitation of the members of this international organization toward multilateralism, that is, toward a solution of the questions affecting the well-being and progress of the majority of the world community by political means, given the equal participation of all members of the community, was revealed in relief at the session.

A trend toward the affirmation of a new style and new standard of relations between the UN members was revealed at the session also. Predominant on this occasion was not an exchange of propaganda remarks but a serious, mutually respectful dialogue. A dissonant note to the overall mood was sounded by pretensions to arrogant omniscience and the outright rejection of this viewpoint or the other merely because it is not submitted from one's "own" political bloc.

Renovative in nature also was the aspiration to the adoption of decisions not by vote but general consent, that is, consensus. Never before in the history of the United Nations were so many consensus decisions recorded—one-third of those adopted at the session. It is indicative that it was by way of general consent that the Declaration on the Nonuse of Force in International Relations was adopted—after many years of its discussion in the United Nations.

The basis of the formation of the new trends are the considerable changes in international life. And it has to be said plainly that these changes were linked primarily at the session with the new foreign policy thinking and modus operandi of the Soviet Union, the starting point of which was April 1985. M.S. Gorbachev's article, "Reality and Assurances of a Secure World," which was addressed to the session, was unequivocally perceived as evidence of the USSR's firm resolve to actively involve, together with Soviet-American dialogue, for the purpose of a change for the better both the United Nations and all multilateral cooperation mechanisms. The achievement of the INF accord, which the session greeted with enthusiasm, intensified the aspiration to the realization in practical policy of the mandate pertaining to the main problems of the present day formulated in the United Nations.

The adoption of the resolution "Creation of an All-Embracing System of International Peace and Security" in response to the initiative of the socialist countries was also a pivotal event in the life of the United Nations. It signified a conceptual breakthrough in the approach—in conformity with nuclear-space reality—to the central mission of the United Nations—maintaining international peace and security. The resolution expresses the conviction that new thinking based on a recognition of the fact that states can live together with and not against one another must guide UN members' actions. It contains an appeal to the members of the international community that they concentrate efforts on ensuring common, all-embracing security by peaceful political means on an equal basis and in all spheres of international relations in accordance with the UN Charter and within the UN framework. In other words, the resolution formulated in concentrated form the essence of the concept of an all-embracing security system, which had been advanced by the 27th CPSU Congress and adopted as the common platform of the group of UN socialist states which presented at the session a joint memorandum on this question.

I would not either dramatize or downplay the results of the voting. It should be borne in mind in evaluating them that the resolution was passed by a substantial majority—76 to 12. A further state subsequently joined with those which had voted in favor. Of course, these results are different from those of the preceding year. At that time only two countries voted against the socialist countries' proposal. But it should be considered here that, first, it was a question at the 41st Session of a resolution predominantly of a procedural nature and, second, the present resolution did not simply support the idea put forward by the socialist countries but also oriented the United Nations and its specialized institutions toward the development of dialogue on an all-embracing security system in breadth and in depth and instructed the UN secretary general to study ways and means of organizing an exchange of opinions between member delegations and submit the corresponding report. It is significant that leading members of the nonaligned movement—Zimbabwe, India, Algeria, Yugoslavia, Nigeria and Indonesia—voted in favor of the resolution. Among those voting in favor were such states as Austria, Finland, Brazil, Mexico and Saudi Arabia. Of course, the number of abstentions was great: difficulties of adapting to the changing political environment are reflected. Some of the abstainers are disposed to derive benefits for themselves from the disagreements between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, swapping their votes for promises of economic and military assistance. Some preferred to adopt a wait-and-see position. But there are also those which did not completely comprehend the content of our proposals.

Those which voted against, on the other hand, manifestly failed to conceal their concern that the development of dialogue in connection with the formation of a

system of security equal for all could signify for them a collapse of the stereotypes and prejudices which uphold military-power politics and confrontation in international relations. Some nuclear powers simply cannot forgo the habit of living on the dividends from nuclear terror. It is for this reason that the arguments which they formally put up against the socialist countries' proposal withstand no in any way serious criticism. We would recall the favorite American argument that an all-embracing security system would substitute for the UN system. But this is sophistry of the first water! An all-embracing system of international peace and security means a system based on the UN Charter and developing within the framework thereof and adaptation of the charter, which was drawn up in the prenuclear era, to the nuclear-space reality of our day. Or let us take the argument of the British. They declare that they do not understand what is meant by the word "system." But it is obvious to every graduate of higher educational institutions, not to mention those who were taught in Oxford and Cambridge, where the majority of British diplomats comes from, that what is understood by "system" is the sum total of components forming a particular entirety, a unity, and the system of all-embracing security proceeds from the fact that in an interdependent world it is necessary to ensure mutually assured survival in the face not only of the nuclear danger but also other global threats to mankind (an "ecosystem," the unsettled state of international economic relations, including foreign debt, nonequivalent commodity exchange and so forth, for example). Of course, the results of the voting need to be considered in practical work, but it is at the same time necessary to consider also the fact that there is now an officially approved UN document containing the recommendation that all its members contribute by practical action to the creation of a reliable system of security equal for all.

Now about the voting in respect of Afghanistan and Cambodia. The renovation processes occurring in the United Nations are developing in complex manner. They are encountering settled ideas and approaches. Some of them have been created artificially, others have their roots in a particular political practice. All this was manifested noticeably during discussion of the situation in respect of Afghanistan and Cambodia. In respect of a settlement of both issues the socialist countries proposed a new approach—an approach from standpoints of political dialogue contributing to the creation of external conditions conducive to the solution of these problems on the basis of national reconciliation. It should be said that this approach elicited positive comment and proved to be in keeping with UN members' mood. Sentiments in support of a solution of conflict and crisis situations were predominant at the session, and the policy of national reconciliation initiated in the Republic of Afghanistan was perceived as a base model for the settlement of conflict and crisis situations.

But, as you rightly observed, this was not reflected in the results of the voting on the draft resolutions on Afghanistan and Cambodia. Why not? The explanation, I

believe, is that the vast majority of UN members demands the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces. Behind this is the rejection of any exception whatever to the principles of the nonuse of force and noninterference in internal affairs, regardless of the motives. And there is evidently reason for this. Having repeatedly been an object of imperialist policy, the developing countries fear that any deviation from the principles of the nonuse of force and noninterference—even within the framework of article 51 of the UN Charter providing for the right to self-defense—could be used by those who operate in the name of their imperial ambitions. They see it as their job to introduce to consciousness and practice unconditional compliance with the principles of the nonuse of force and noninterference, which, they emphasize, constitute the basis of the organization's charter.

[Question] The report "October and Perestroika: the Revolution Continues" speaks of our inadequate response in the past "to the provocative actions of imperialism" which frequently led to international crises. Could you be more specific on this point with reference to the activity of Soviet diplomacy in the United Nations?

[Answer] The proposition concerning our inadequate response may be illustrated perfectly well in the example of the United Nations. Subjective factors were reflected here in the past, I believe. Considerable harm was done in the first postwar years also by our black and white vision of the world and the application of the "whoever is not with us is against us" yardstick to the political standpoints and politicians of other states. All this was intensified by "prosecuting council" rhetoric, which was contrary to the very essence of the United Nations. As a result it was far from always possible to consolidate the peace-loving forces in the organization and curb the supporters of the "cold war" and military adventures, although there were, I believe, opportunities for this. For example, in 1949-1950 the Soviet representative periodically walked out of sessions of such a most important UN body as the Security Council. Although this was done as a sign of justified protest against the fact that China's seat in the council was at that time occupied by representatives not of the PRC but the Taiwan regime, a refusal to participate in the work of UN bodies is not in principle a method of multilateral diplomacy.

But it is important to bear in mind that our policy in the United Nations has always corresponded to the general direction determined by V.I. Lenin in respect of international organizations, when he dispatched the Soviet delegation to the first international conference—in Genoa. It is a question of using the potential of these organizations to prevent war.

And one further point. When speaking of the inadequacy of the response to "the provocative actions of imperialism" in the past it is important to draw the appropriate conclusions for the future also. A refusal to take part in negotiations and disregard for different standpoints is a

path which is incompatible with the new foreign policy thinking. Recognizing the entire depth and scale of the problems which arise and finding ways of solving them are only possible in unison, by joint efforts. I recall in this connection an image employed by Marcel Proust. He wrote that one and the same mountain appears differently from different sides and different altitudes. A multidimensional and stereoscopic vision of the interdependent world in which we live and the global problems confronting all mankind may be obtained primarily in the United Nations. And with an objective picture of the world finding the optimum solutions is easier also. It is for this reason that we propose full use of the UN mechanisms. When we speak of a nuclear-free, nonviolent world, it is inconceivable without the controlling influence of the United Nations.

[Question] Have there been, do you believe, any positive changes in the United States' attitude toward the United Nations? How do you assess the possible evolution of its position on this question?

[Answer] I have the impression that the very formulation of the question contains a desire to discern positive trends in the U.S. approach to the United Nations. I believe that this desire is perfectly justified since the functioning of the United Nations as a center for coordinating the actions of all members is impossible without the full-fledged participation of the United States and its constructive approach to the questions discussed in this organization. And, as the session showed, it is to this that the states aspire.

Unfortunately, I cannot give an unequivocal answer to your question. I believe that the American public is beginning to tend toward the active participation of the United States in the United Nations and other international organizations, but Congress is stubbornly resisting this. And the Kassebaum Amendment, according to which the United States should seek not a change in its position in accordance with the requirements of the charter but adaptation of the United Nations to its narrowly understood national interests, is a fact, as before. Nor is the administration itself distinguished by a great disposition toward the United Nations. Look at what is actually happening. The United States is impeding the achievement of consensus on such questions as prevention of an arms race in space, refused to take part in the International Conference on Disarmament and Development being conducted under the aegis of the United Nations, is taking no part in UNESCO activity and is holding back from payment in full of its annual contribution to the UN budget, thereby putting it in a difficult financial position. Some 25 percent of the organization's annual budget is due from the United States, which amounts to \$214 million, but it has already fallen \$252.8 million in arrears. It should be said that whereas for the United Nations this is a large amount, by American standards it is not that great and, as American specialists have estimated, would not be enough to keep the Pentagon running for one day.

I believe that the American representatives who abuse other states for frequently voting from positions different to Washington's and in a whole number of cases openly criticizing the United States for the emergence of this problem or the other distressing to the world community are wrong. When the United States finds itself isolated at the time of the adoption of a decision on this question or the other, the reasons for this are its self-isolation and the policy which an American commentator described as a "policy of iso-nationalism". The Americans frequently resemble the soldier who maintains that the entire company is out of step with him.

The sooner the United States brings its policy into line with the policy of general consent and the surmounting of confrontation which is taking hold in the United Nations, the better it will be both for itself and for the United Nations, whose activity should in our interdependent world be based on the joint actions of all states—large and small. It is this that is the true democratization and humanization of international relations.

[Question] M.S. Gorbachev's article which you mentioned advanced the idea of the creation under the aegis of the United Nations of a world consultative council, which would unite the world's intellectual elite. How has this idea been greeted in the world community? Are any specific steps being taken to implement it?

[Answer] The Soviet leader's idea has been received with great interest in the United Nations. There is a growing understanding there of the need to spiritually enrich and ethically elevate world politics, ensuring governments' close interaction with leading representatives of science and art. The idea of converting the Disarmament Research Council, which functions under the UN secretary general, into a kind of "council of wise men" which would unite intellectuals of all countries and provide the United Nations with recommendations on global problems is being expressed, for example. This is an interesting idea, I believe.

[Question] There has been a debate recently among Soviet political scientists and international affairs experts on problems of "control" of the world community. The question of whether the United Nations may be considered a kind of "embryonic" future "world government" is being posed, for example. What is your view?

[Answer] It is very good, I believe, that such a debate has begun. In an interdependent world particular significance is attached to the question of the conscious stimulation and direction of positive processes of international cooperation, and it should be examined with regard for the experience accumulated by the United Nations and its specialized institutions and also the IAEA in the development of cooperation between all states.

It seems to me that application to the United Nations of the "world government" yardstick is hardly justified. The United Nations is not a world "government" or "parliament" nor, equally, is it a debating club bestowing on the world merely some pious wishes. It is an international political formation of a special quality and a kind of instrument for safeguarding the common interests of all states of the community, primarily the most important of them—the survival of mankind. This instrument should be used as per its intention (it is defined in the UN Charter), which is without analogy either in international practice or, even more, in the political life of any state. It is difficult today to imagine precisely what actual forms the United Nations will acquire in the process of the formation and functioning of an all-embracing system of peace and security. But one thing is clear: the formation of such a system will be the realization of the charter in full under the actual conditions of the nuclear-space era and growing interdependence. The United Nations should be a kind of regulator in the world system of states, a mechanism of the legal and political deterrence of global threats to the existence of mankind, a place of dialogue and cooperation and the location of a generally acceptable balance of the interests of all countries. In a word, the United Nations is an instrument of the democratically organized international community. And for the organization to be perceived as such it is necessary to overcome the view thereof via the prism of narrowly understood national interests. As the Zimbabwean representative rightly observed, the United Nations cannot be regarded in categories of one's "own" or "another's" organization. It must be perceived by all its members as a common organization serving the interests of all participants in the international community together and of each individually.

And, finally, one further point. The very "United Nations" concept presupposes that not only states but also the public must play an ever increasing part in the organization. The organizational foundations for the democratization and humanization of international relations will be created thereby. It is within this conceptual framework that I see the contours of a new, unparalleled organization for the development of relations of cooperation and trust in an interdependent world.

[Question] There is a growing belief in circles of the world community, the academic community included, that an increase in the effectiveness of the United Nations in ensuring international peace and security is possible on condition that decisive significance in its activity is attached to "negotiation diplomacy" instead of the present "declaration and resolution diplomacy." Is a "breakthrough" in this field possible?

[Answer] It is hardly correct to counterpose "declaration and resolution diplomacy" to "negotiation diplomacy." There should be room in UN activity for each of these varieties of multilateral diplomacy. And the organization itself is by its structure adapted to the practice of

both types of diplomatic activity. According to the charter, the General Assembly adopts recommendations to the UN members, and these recommendations, in the form of resolutions and declarations expressing their opinion, should be of great moral and political force and create a climate contributing to the successful realization of "negotiation diplomacy." There is for "negotiation diplomacy" both the UN Security Council, which is called on to study and adopt binding decisions on a broad range of issues pertaining to the preservation of international peace and security, and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament working in close contact with the United Nations, albeit not formally a part of its system. The Geneva Conference is a unique multilateral negotiating body.

It is important to observe a balance between the two varieties of multilateral diplomatic activity. Recently, it has to be said, it has been disturbed manifestly in favor of "declaration and resolution diplomacy" to the detriment of "negotiation diplomacy," which has been reflected most negatively in both the activity of the United Nations and in its appearance. The task today is not simply to restore this balance but to considerably strengthen the place of "negotiation diplomacy" in the UN system. The opportunities for this exist. An example is the Security Council's new approach to the Iran-Iraq conflict, which is characterized by the unity of action of the Council's permanent members and support for the efforts of the UN secretary general. This model of behavior of the Security Council should be applied to a solution of other conflict and crisis situations also, with regard for their specific features, of course. It is also important that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament similarly begin to really produce results. The completion this year of work on a convention banning chemical weapons would be an important act both in the plane of elimination of a most barbarous type of weapon of annihilation and in the plane of impetus being imparted to the multilateral disarmament negotiating process. The upcoming UN General Assembly Third Special Disarmament Session, at which there will be a wide-ranging international dialogue on the entire spectrum of disarmament issues, could on the other hand be an example of "declaration diplomacy" capable of imparting strong impetus to "negotiation diplomacy." The states will expound from the platform of the session their views, concerns and interests. But it is important that the impending exchange of opinions be geared to joint search for ways and means of ensuring security via disarmament based on a balance of the interests of all groups of UN members. It is such an approach which would ensure the cohesion of efforts for imparting to the disarmament process a continuous and consistently growing and intensifying nature.

The document which the special session will have to approve will be of the nature of a recommendation. But if it reflects a balance of interests, the adoption of such a "declaration" will facilitate the formulation of specific measures at negotiations. In other words, active and

purposive "declaration diplomacy" contributes to a clarification of positions and a quest for their coordination with a view to practical business. We support the accumulated potential of positive UN recommendations and resolutions being put into political practice. The more so in that the Soviet-American INF accord serves as a signal for action in all directions of world politics.

I am sure that a breakthrough in practical matters is perfectly possible.

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### Scientific Fact Must Back Political View of Disarmament

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MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
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[Article by Aleksey Georgiyevich Arbatov, doctor of historical sciences, head of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO Disarmament and Security Department: "Deep Cuts in Strategic Arms"]

[Text] This article, publication of which will be completed in the next issue of the journal, illustrates key problems of the negotiations between the USSR and the United States on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. It analyzes questions of the preservation of the ABM Treaty and the role and place of an accord on the timeframe of nonwithdrawal from this treaty. The prospects of the complete elimination of strategic arms and attendant questions of disarmament and a strengthening of security are studied. The main aspects of the treaty on a 50 percent cut in strategic arms which is in preparation, in the context of a strengthening of the stability of the military-strategic balance at lower levels of nuclear arsenals included, are examined also.

Following the signing in Washington of the INF Treaty, the question of a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms (SOA) has taken pride of place on the disarmament agenda. From the viewpoint of an improvement in Soviet-American relations and the recovery of the entire international atmosphere the importance of a treaty on a significant lowering of the levels of the two biggest strategic potentials is obvious and needs no explanation. But the military-strategic aspect of the question is no less significant.

For example, currently, as is known, over 20,000 nuclear weapons are deployed altogether in the strategic forces of the USSR and the United States. Comparatively small numbers of them may be retargeted at facilities in Europe and Asia which were previously threatened by attack on the part of approximately 2,200 warheads of



medium- and shorter-range missiles. A 50 percent reduction in strategic missiles would make such retargeting more difficult. Considering the makeup of the two powers' strategic forces, a 50-percent cut would in itself, probably, entail the elimination for the USSR and the United States of a sum total of over 2,000 deployed missiles and aircraft, over 70 missile-firing nuclear submarines and more than 10,000 nuclear warheads. A further reduction in SOA, in which more than 90 percent of destructive nuclear power in the world is concentrated, will be the central direction of the process of a lessening and, ultimately, the complete removal of the nuclear threat.

A number of steps in the direction of the new treaty was taken at the Washington meeting of the leaders of the USSR and the United States. The representatives of the two powers in Geneva were instructed to strive for the completion of the formulation of the treaty, preferably by the next summit in the first half of 1988. Specifically, the joint statement reflected certain new agreed parameters of the future treaty, to other points it was decided to pay increased attention.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time many questions await solution. It would seem important to dwell particularly on three points. First, the embodiment in a mutually acceptable form of an agreement concerning compliance with the ABM Treaty as an inalienable condition of a reduction in SOA. Second, it is a question of the ultimate goal of a reduction in strategic offensive arms. And, third, it is essential to ascertain the first cause of the remaining disagreements on a multitude of questions directly connected with the stage under discussion of deep cuts therein—a 50 percent reduction.

In connection with the examination of these complex problems the time has come to finally begin an open discussion of certain important procedural questions also. A hidden polemic between two currents has long been under way in circles of Soviet political scientists dealing with problems of international security and disarmament. The representatives of one of them believe that study of these topics requires in-depth knowledge of military strategy, weapons systems and the military balance of forces. The adherents to the other maintain that the main thing is policy and that military-technical details, "pieces of iron," so to speak, merely distract the analysis from the main issues. The disagreements between the "technocrats" and "politicians," as the representatives of these two informal schools sometimes call one another, not without sarcasm (summoning up associations with the arguments on other issues of the "physicists" and "lyric poets" in the 1960's), are of more than purely academic significance. Taking different approaches as a basis, individual specialists in the United States and Canada Institute, the IMEMO and other research centers frequently reach dissimilar conclusions on identical problems.

The profound restructuring of Soviet foreign policy and its unprecedented dynamic character, which is perceptible particularly in the disarmament sphere, where it has already produced the first good results, naturally presuppose the existence of different viewpoints, an open struggle of opinions and constructive debate, on the most important problems of disarmament, security and military sufficiency included. "There was a time when acute topics were not broached and opinions, innocuous even, but differing from official opinions, were not expressed," USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze observed. "This time is now gone."<sup>2</sup>

Only thus may a serious scientific basis for practical activity be developed. The big interest in the opinion of scientists being displayed currently by the foreign policy departments of state of the Soviet Union confronts science with increased demands.

#### **The SDI Program and Compliance With the ABM Treaty**

Soviet scientific literature of recent times has thoroughly examined the destabilizing consequences of a possible broad-based ABM system with space-based components. They could have a negative effect on the prospects of preservation of the ABM Treaty and the possibilities of the prohibition of ASAT weapons systems and other space-based assault systems. This is directly related to the stability of the military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States and the possibility of deep cuts in SOA and prevention of the development of third-generation nuclear weapons. The course of events will play an important part for a reduction in the economic costs of military rivalry. The international-political situation in the broadest meaning of the word, including the security of the allies of the great powers and other countries, will depend on the state of affairs in this sphere.<sup>3</sup>

The joint statement of 10 December 1987 set the goal of the achievement of an accord on compliance with the ABM Treaty "in the form in which it was signed in 1972 in the process of the research, development and, if necessary, testing which are authorized in accordance with the ABM Treaty." The parties will undertake not to withdraw from the treaty within an agreed timeframe. Intensive negotiations are to begin within 3 years prior to its expiry, but if the parties do not come to an agreement otherwise, each will have the right to determine its *modus operandi* itself. This accord should have the same legal status as the treaty on SOA, the ABM Treaty and other agreements.<sup>4</sup>

The logic of the powers' mutual undertaking not to avail themselves within a particular timeframe of the right to withdraw from the treaty (which is recorded in article XV with the condition of 6 months' notification) is based on the following considerations. The sovereign right of each state which is a party to any treaty is the possibility, given certain conditions, of withdrawing

from it, and no one intends depriving the United States and the USSR of this right in respect of the ABM Treaty. But if the parties negotiate deep cuts in SOA, then—in view of the objective organic relationship of offensive and defensive arms—additional safeguards for ensuring certainty in this important sphere will be necessary. In other words, assurances are needed that a major reduction in the level of offensive strategic potentials will take place under conditions of strict compliance with the limitations on defensive systems. Otherwise a reduction in strategic arms could, instead of strengthening stability, facilitate the collapse thereof. This conclusion is based on the premise that the party which at some stage decides, after all, to withdraw from the treaty and create broad-based ABM defenses could ensure its greater efficiency the fewer its remaining intercept targets, that is, ballistic missiles and their warheads.

Key significance in the wording of the statement is attached to the words concerning compliance with the treaty "in the form in which it was signed in 1972." Their import cannot signify anything other, it would seem, than the illegality of the so-called "broad interpretation," in accordance with which the testing in space of ABM componentry and systems based on new physical principles (laser, microwave charged-particle beam and others) is allegedly permitted. In fact the parties subscribed in Washington to the original, truly correct interpretation of the treaty, whereby the testing of ABM systems and componentry based on new physical principles is possible only if they are in permanent ground-based mode. And their deployment is to be the subject of a special accord lest there be a violation of the strict quantitative, qualitative and territorial limitations of article III of the treaty and the 1974 protocol thereto (in accordance with which there may be just one ABM deployment area).

At the same time, however, the accord on nonwithdrawal within an agreed timeframe from the treaty, which is in terms of its status of unlimited duration, should not be seen as a kind of agreement on its virtually automatic cessation upon the expiry of this timeframe. In accordance with article XV of the treaty, withdrawal therefrom is not permitted, for example, simply in view of the successful development of one's engineering programs affording a prospect of effective ABM defense of a territory. Either party may do such only if "it decides that the exceptional circumstances connected with the content of this treaty have jeopardized its highest interests."<sup>5</sup> This means that the United States could, for example, withdraw from the treaty owing to its violation by the Soviet Union or in connection with an increase in the latter's offensive nuclear forces.

But the USSR has no intention of violating the treaty and proposes the settlement to mutual satisfaction of all disagreements on questions of compliance therewith (the decision to freeze for a year the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar station is geared to this also). In turn, it is proposed reducing strategic arms by 50 percent and

subsequently to even lower levels, that is, the threat of offensive nuclear arms will diminish—given the permanency of the antimissile arms limitation practice.

It is therefore important to guarantee that the opponents of the treaty cannot in exchange for an undertaking on nonwithdrawal within a particular timeframe predetermine the cessation thereof following the expiration of this period, regardless of the letter and spirit of article XV. Unfortunately, it is this arbitrary interpretation of this approach which has been encountered increasingly often in the United States recently. Furthermore, it may be concluded that, having been unable to smash the treaty head-on (which was demonstrated by Sen S. Nunn's report in 1987 and the resolution of Congress passed on the basis thereof essentially rejecting the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty), the devotees of an ABM space-based system are now putting their hopes increasingly in the cessation thereof upon the completion of the nonwithdrawal term. They are putting the main emphasis on a phrase in the joint statement saying that "provided the parties do not agree otherwise, each party will have the right to determine its *modus operandi* itself." These circles are hoping that they will now succeed in continuing the space-based ABM system on the pretext of the creation of "trump cards" for negotiations "from a position of strength" on the mode of strategic relations of the USSR and the United States after the expiry of the nonwithdrawal period. Specifically, in January 1988 the American side submitted the draft "Treaty Between the United States and the USSR on Certain Measures Contributing to the Transition on the Basis of Cooperation to the Deployment of Future Strategic Defenses Against Ballistic Missiles."<sup>6</sup> The desire is to hereby impart to the SDI program, which in 1986-1987 came in for increasingly sharp criticism from the viewpoint of technical-strategic justifiability and from appropriations for which Congress has cut increasingly substantial amounts, a "second wind."

There will have to be, it would seem, in a subsequent Soviet-American accord on compliance with the treaty complete clarity in respect of the fact that "the right to determine one's *modus operandi*" by no means nullifies the wording of article XV of the treaty and that the period of nonwithdrawal absolutely does not imply a limitation on the term of validity of this agreement of unlimited duration.

A political analysis of the problem taking into consideration both the role of the treaty in Soviet-American relations and the system and process of arms limitation and the domestic political situation in the United States leads to these conclusions. However, this analysis would be manifestly incomplete without an examination of the strategic and military-technical aspects of the problem.

The opinion of the majority of experts agrees that owing to the "immaturity" of exotic ABM space-based technology the question of the feasibility of a broad-based ABM defense will not be clear before the mid-1990's, while the

full-scale testing of its components and the deployment of such a system are a matter for the end of the 1990s-start of the 21st century, at least. The difficulties which the plan for the "early deployment" of a space-based ABM defense in 1987 has encountered in the United States were yet further graphic confirmation of this. In the foreseeable period, while deployment of a space-based ABM system is not on the agenda, the key question technically and strategically is the interpretation of the treaty's restrictive provisions in respect of specific ABM and space-based programs. And it is important here that Washington not attempt, by hook or by crook, as they say, to once more resurrect for its consent to assume a formal undertaking on nonwithdrawal the "broad interpretation" of a number of articles of the treaty. It is no secret that interested circles are attempting to portray the realization of SDI projects as not being in violation of the terms of the treaty. For this SDI components are being presented as "test models" and "subcomponents," and testing, as "experiments," and attempts are being made to portray experiments involving space-based systems as tests involving the putting of devices in space not in orbit but on a pre-orbital ballistic trajectory and so forth. The United States delegation at the Geneva negotiations has as of the start of 1988 resumed attempts to uphold the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, maintaining that the experiments and testing of a number of SDI components are permitted by the joint Soviet-American statement at the Washington meeting.<sup>7</sup>

Verifiable limitations on such work in keeping with the authentic interpretation of the terms of ABM limitation would be a most important actual safeguard against a surprise spurt ahead by either power in the space-based ABM sphere. And there arises with all seriousness in this connection the need for an accord on the limits of permitted research in the sphere of ABM defenses based on new physical principles, specifically with respect to the specifications of the devices put into space and the operations which they perform. R&D in this sphere is a long and costly process which it is difficult to conceal. If in the course of the development thereof agreed limits were violated, the other party would have sufficient time to adopt military-technical, political, international-legal and other countermeasures. If, however, there are no such limitations and programs of military-technical efforts and experiments become far advanced in an atmosphere of uncertainty, the treaty's restrictive significance could be gradually eroded even without formal withdrawal from it. And this would predetermine the cessation thereof after the expiry of the nonwithdrawal period.

While not in the least belittling the political role of the undertaking on nonwithdrawal from the treaty it is necessary not to lose sight of the military-strategic aspects either. As a document in international law, such an undertaking would be as dependable as the military-strategic deterrent factors are strong. If they are inadequate for preventing the denunciation or the simply

perfidious violation of the ABM Treaty—the cornerstone of the entire international system of arms limitation—the situation could hardly be saved by an additional nonwithdrawal undertaking (the less so in that the American side is insisting on the incorporation in the undertaking also of reservations permitting, given certain conditions, renunciation of compliance with the nonwithdrawal timeframe).

The main military-strategic factor actually influencing the plans for the creation based on the SDI of a global ABM system with space-based echelons is the probability of countermeasures on the part of the other side. The Soviet Union has adopted the optimum policy in this respect, declaring that its retaliatory steps would be asymmetrical to the SDI program and less costly and would require a shorter timeframe.

The most effective such measure, it would seem to us, would be the development of systems directly combating the ABM space-based echelons with the use of nuclear and kinetic weapons and directed-energy systems and also EW weapons—ground-, sea-, air- and, if necessary, space-based. They would be intended not for the annihilation of the population and material assets of the United States but for the destruction of space-based attack arms and disruption of the functioning of its observation, tracking, control and communications systems. In addition, it is a question of ensuring for the weapons countering space-based ABM defenses high survivability and imparting to them sufficient invulnerability both to a strike by the United States' offensive nuclear weapons and the impact of American space-based arms.

Undoubtedly, from the political viewpoint the process of deep cuts in SOA would in itself weaken support for the SDI in the United States and strengthen the popularity of the ABM Treaty. It is natural to ask, however: would not a radical reduction in SOA facilitate the creation subsequently of a more efficient ABM system or, simply put, would not a reduction in strategic arms by half make the creation in the future of a space-based ABM system twice as easy or half as costly? And in this case also the political analysis should be buttressed by evaluations of a strategic and military-technical nature.

First, many studies show convincingly that the effectiveness of a space-based ABM system (employing DEW weapons included) would in the broad range of correlations of forces depend not only on the quantity of the other side's strategic missiles but even more on their qualitative specifications (specifically, the time of the boost phase of the trajectory, the speed of separation of the warheads and the perfection of the decoys) and also on the modes of basing, tactics of use and efficacy of the weapons directly combating the ABM space-based echelons.<sup>8</sup>

Second, the components of the ABM system being developed within the framework of the SDI program are geared directly to the interception of existing types of Soviet ground- and sea-launched ballistic missiles and the modifications thereof anticipated in the foreseeable period. Considering the tremendous approximate cost of a multi-echelon ABM system, those carrying out the SDI program are gambling on the retaliatory measures costing the Soviet Union relatively (or even absolutely) more. The hope is expressed here that the USSR will take the costliest and least profitable path of an "extensive" buildup of its existing types of missile forces and that this will divert its resources from their qualitative upgrading.

Third, the main calculation is being made on the fact that the Soviet Union, with its traditionally big reliance on defensive weapons (specifically, expressed in the maintenance of a broad-based ABM system and one permitted ABM complex around Moscow), will for all that not stick to the policy of "asymmetrical retaliatory measures" and will be pulled into rivalry in costly space- and ground-based ABM systems. In such a competition, the supporters of SDI hope, many geostrategic and technical disproportions would begin to work to the USSR's disadvantage. In a certain sense the tasks of an American ABM defense in this context would be made noticeably easier: its efficiency would be gauged not only and not so much in comparison with Soviet offensive arms and counterweapons as in comparison with the Soviet ABM system as such. An arms race in this sphere would, moreover, divert forces and resources from systems for directly countering the space-based components of an American ABM defense.

Thus a 50 percent cut in SOA would indeed exert little influence on the efficiency of a probable American ABM defense in the technical respect. But at the same time it would in a certain sense facilitate, if necessary, the adoption of countermeasures in response to the deployment of a U.S. ABM system. Finally, as a final measure, there would always remain the possibility of once again building up SOA to the present levels and higher were this deemed expedient. Such a step could be effected far more rapidly and at less cost than that which would be required for the full-scale testing and deployment of a multi-echelon American ABM system with space-based components.

At the same time the said possible measures of political and military-technical counteraction of the development of new space-based ABM systems do not remove the need for special steps to ensure compliance with the ABM Treaty. They would be necessary even in the event of the United States' unequivocal renunciation of the "broad interpretation" thereof. An accord on the timeframe of nonwithdrawal from the treaty could be used for the achievement within an agreed time of mutually acceptable agreements on these questions.

Military-technical progress creates the danger of the increasingly great erosion of the restrictive framework of the treaty and the parties' increased mutual fears and suspicions in connection with development in related strategic and technical spheres. An ABM defense for combating tactical ballistic missiles, new air defense weapons, ASAT arms, qualitatively new space-based power-supply, observation, tracking, communications and battle management systems, ground-based laser devices with space-based reflector mirrors and such could be such spheres. Many of them are not currently covered by the treaty directly, but could from various directions lead to an erosion of its restrictive terms. Some of these systems will objectively possess this degree or the other of ballistic missile intercept potential, others will open channels for an upgrading of technology to levels close to the requirements of a space-based ABM defense and, finally, yet others will make extremely difficult the monitoring of compliance with the treaty, differentiation between prohibited and permitted activity and verification of compliance with the limitations on the testing and deployment even of space-based ABM systems.

#### **The Problem of Eliminating Strategic Arms**

An important subject of disagreements between the USSR and the United States is the ultimate goal of cuts in SOA. The Soviet Union advocates their complete elimination, even within a 10 year timeframe, possibly. The United States officially advocates the elimination only of ballistic missiles, but not heavy bombers and cruise missiles. True, this position is not taken seriously in American specialist circles. The vast majority of the latter supports, with this reservation or the other, a certain reduction, but not the complete elimination of strategic arms, including ballistic missiles.

A political analysis shows convincingly the unreliability and danger of a world based on the confrontation of growing nuclear potentials of general annihilation. The political importance and constructiveness of the declared goal of the complete elimination of strategic arms and all nuclear weapons is perfectly obvious. However, the far-reaching and multilevel nature and complexity of the set task are even more palpable in a military-strategic and military-technical context.

To begin with the fact that its accomplishment would mean (as of the state of affairs on 1 January 1988) the dismantling on both sides of a sum total of 2,390 ICBM launchers and the missiles themselves, 1,614 SLBM launchers, approximately 100 SSBN's and 750 heavy bombers.<sup>9</sup> This means that both states must decommission an average of 475 missiles and aircraft and 10 submarines annually. And this on condition that over the 10-year period neither side commission a single new system and a single missile or bomber. Otherwise the scale of the cuts in compensation would be even greater. For comparison it may be recalled that in accordance with SALT I and SALT II both parties withdrew from

the strategic forces over 15 years (1972-1987) approximately 900 ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers and also 26 SSBN's, that is, an average of approximately 60 delivery systems and 2 submarines a year.<sup>10</sup> It stands to reason that a dependable barrier to space-based arms has to be erected here. The ABM complexes and strategic air defense components which are permitted currently would evidently have to be eliminated also.

But granted the entire extent thereof, the physical parameters of the reductions are still not the most complex aspect of the problem. Considering the lengthy timeframe of the development, construction (10-15 years) and occurrence in effective combat strength (20-30 years) of strategic arms, an accord on the complete elimination of SOA in such a short time would essentially mean a simultaneous "freeze" on all programs for an upgrading of existing and the creation of new weapons systems (including a complete ban on nuclear testing) with the corresponding verification methods and modes. It would be essential also to ban the creation of other types of weapons of mass annihilation and to do away with existing stockpiles.

The political goal has been set and is not questioned either among specialists on international policy problems or among experts on military-strategic issues, who are wedded to the idea of ensuring security politically and not militarily and who really aspire to a rapid lessening and, ultimately, the complete removal of the threat of nuclear war. But it is the duty of these specialists to elaborate specific paths of progress toward the set goal with regard for political and military realities and reveal the relationship and mutual influence of various steps in this direction. It was for this that M.S. Gorbachev called, emphasizing that "politicians need scientific arguments and scientific conclusions for decision-making not only in respect of domestic but international issues also."<sup>11</sup>

Strategic arms are not simply a "superstructure" of the most devastating weapons crowning modern military arsenals of which one may take hold and cut off in isolation. SOA are the pivot of the global strategic and military-political situation permeating its objective relationships. For example, the significance of the geostrategic asymmetry of the location of the USSR and the United States could increase anew given the elimination of global-range weapons. The impermissibility of the elimination of SOA returning the world to the period of the 1940's-1950's, when American territory was virtually beyond the reach of nuclear weapons owing to the USSR's lack of intercontinental delivery systems, while Soviet cities were within the range of American forward-based nuclear weapons, is perfectly obvious. Consequently, such arms have to be done away with in parallel, and it is a question, what is more, not only of the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles but also medium bombers of the two sides and airfield- and carrier-based operational-tactical strike aircraft.

Tactical nuclear weapons and battlefield nuclear weapons could hardly under such conditions remain outside of the framework of agreements.<sup>12</sup> Otherwise there would be considerable underpinning for the "limited" and "local nuclear war" concepts, which are currently manifestly groundless owing to the inevitable escalation of a nuclear conflict to a global catastrophe. Particularly in the eyes of the power the furthest away from the contemplated military theaters.

"Dual-capable" missiles are, in the main, the delivery systems of tactical nuclear weapons, and their range is increasing constantly, which would permit their use for delivering strategic strikes to a great depth also, at administrative and industrial targets included (we would recall that the warheads which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, according to the modern classification, tactical in terms of yield).

The elimination of tactical nuclear weapons would, in turn, lead to the need for the adoption of large-scale disarmament measures in the sphere of conventional arms and armed forces. First, the technical aspect of the question. The destruction of tactical nuclear warheads and prevention of the secret concealment if only of a small quantity thereof would be very difficult to monitor. A more dependable guarantee would be the elimination of the launch platforms and the delivery systems and missiles, the majority of which are dual-capable and are integrated in the conventional armed forces.<sup>13</sup> This presupposes the dismantling of significant components of modern armies and, to an even greater extent, of air forces and navies and air defense.

Second, the presence of tactical nuclear weapons and plans for first use thereof in NATO armed forces have been justified traditionally by the alleged "significant superiority" of Warsaw Pact conventional arms and ground forces, of armored and mechanized formations particularly. The Warsaw Pact countries justifiably link deep cuts in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe and their restructuring on exclusively defensive principles with a reduction in dual-capable systems and the subsequent elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus the inseparable relationship of conventional armed forces and tactical nuclear arms is obvious in the strategic plane also.

And, third, cuts in strategic offensive weapons themselves would at a certain stage pose the question of measures in relation to conventional or multipurpose weapons systems, plans for the use of which are directly associated with SOA in an operational respect. It is a question primarily of navies' ASW forces and weapons designed to combat missile-firing nuclear submarines. A substantial, if not preponderant, number of the operational assignments of the surface, submarine and air forces of the navies of the USSR, the United States and a number of their allies is being built around antisubmarine defense and combating the enemy's antisubmarine defenses. This also applies to air defense, where the radar

detection and guidance systems, interceptor-fighters and surface-to-air missile complexes are oriented to a considerable extent against heavy bombers and cruise missiles, not to mention medium bombers and dual-capable operational-tactical attack aircraft.

Thus in accordance with the logic of the objectively existing mechanism of the strategic, operational and technical relationships of the various components of the global and regional military balance the complete removal of so important and central a "unit" thereof as SOA would inevitably call forth a "chain reaction" in the sphere of disarmament in a widening circle of nuclear and conventional elements. This would essentially mean a radical restructuring of the entire military-strategic situation in the world with the abolition of major components thereof on land, at sea and in the air.

However, besides the said vertical "chain reaction," the elimination of SOA and in this connection intermediate-range missiles and operational-tactical and tactical nuclear arms poses the question of the horizontal spread of disarmament measures. It is a question first of all, naturally, of the dismantling of all classes of nuclear arms of Great Britain, France and the PRC and also of the elimination, per the above-mentioned logic, of certain components of their conventional armed forces.

Nuclear weapons are seen by these powers not only as means of ensuring their national security in the narrow sense but also as a factor of their political relations with the USSR and the United States, neighboring nonnuclear states (the FRG, Japan) and also the developing countries. These three powers' renunciation of nuclear status would most likely be accompanied by a number of political conditions pertaining to a restructuring of international relations globally and regionally, as, equally, a demand for additional disarmament measures and military assurances concerning neighboring countries.

The "politician" scientists must have their say in the study of these problems. But this say will be impressive only if an in-depth knowledge of military-strategic issues and their role and place in states' political relations is made the basis thereof. Such an approach demands a higher standard of analytical skill than simply military-technical and military-strategic assessments. But without the latter political analysis is just as impossible as higher mathematics without arithmetic.

Moreover, the nuclear disarmament of the said five powers would require a sharp tightening of the practice of nuclear nonproliferation. It is a question of verification of the existence of the corresponding warheads and, if necessary, their elimination and safeguards against the creation of nuclear weapons in the future (including conversion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into a multilateral treaty) by such states as Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina and India. The same applies to chemical, bacteriological and other types of weapon of mass annihilation. The said

measures obviously could not be some joint forcible action of the five nuclear powers. This would be both politically unacceptable and impermissible from the standpoint of international law and would, besides, evidently prove unfeasible in practice. Consequently, a solution of the question may be based only on the corresponding negotiations and mutually acceptable agreements, which, in turn, presupposes the settlement of a broad range of regional and domestic political and economic problems.

Verification and inspection measures represent a separate problem. They will have to encompass not only SOA but also other nuclear and nonnuclear arms and armed forces of many states, their military activity and the manufacturing and S&T facilities (including nuclear power engineering and enterprises manufacturing fissionable materials) and also extend to a vast set of measures in the field of security and the settlement of international and domestic conflicts.

In posing the question of the complete elimination of strategic arms the Soviet leadership is undoubtedly aware of the entire complexity and military and political multi-aspectuality of this action. Incidentally, the Soviet program for deliverance from nuclear weapons of 15 January 1986 also provides for a comprehensive approach to a solution of the problem, which has begun to be realized already in the INF Treaty and at various current negotiations in the disarmament sphere.

At the same time, however, the bulk of politicians of the West and military and civilian specialists, with whom, in actual fact, the negotiations on these issues will have to be conducted directly, consider such radical steps unrealistic and impracticable in the foreseeable future. But this does not mean that a basis for the parties' dialogue and interaction is lacking altogether.

While differing in their vision of the ultimate goals of a reduction in SOA, the parties have in principle a sizable contact zone—concerning the desirability and feasibility of the first major step on this path—a 50 percent reduction in delivery systems and nuclear weapons over the next few years.

Having in view a perfectly definite ultimate goal of the negotiations, however difficult it seems currently, the Soviet Union has a fundamental advantage over the United States. But a clear goal, granted all its importance, is not everything. On the agenda currently is the thorough elaboration based on the new thinking on security issues of the whole path of movement toward it and of its first stage particularly. And this stage must be marked off with the utmost precision not only from the viewpoint of the quantity of the weapons to be reduced but also in the sphere of the qualitative changes which will take place in the strategic correlation of forces and in the strength of the safeguards against a first strike given

lower levels of the nuclear potentials. Obviously, strategic stability, which, according to prevailing ideas, characterizes the degree of probability of a nuclear war being unleashed, will by no means necessarily strengthen automatically in proportion to the reduction in the quantity of arms. If there is an increase in the vulnerability of the weapons remaining after the reduction, an additional stimulus to a preventive strike could arise, as a result of which the threat of nuclear war could hypothetically increase even.<sup>14</sup>

Specific measures of a 50 percent reduction in SOA should be inscribed in long-term plans providing for successive stages of movement toward the final goal and the opportune preparation of the attendant measures of disarmament and a strengthening of political security. They were discussed above and they go far beyond the framework of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms. A clear ultimate goal is attractive primarily because it makes it possible to make political ways and means of ensuring security the cornerstone. That is, the achievement of a consistent series of agreements to which both diplomatic policy in Geneva and current military programs should be subordinated.

The American approach suffers primarily from the vagueness of the ultimate goal of the SOA reduction process. If it envisages an end to this process following the realization of 50 percent cuts or at some other lower level, it thereby knowingly undermines the officially proclaimed goal of "consolidating the stability of the strategic balance." After all, at whatever level the SOA reduction process is halted and however stable the balance recorded by the treaty is initially, S&T progress in the sphere of strategic systems and in related fields will in time inevitably erode this stability and create new means and methods capable of unleashing and waging a nuclear war. The vagueness of ultimate goal condemns U.S. policy in Geneva to follow the lead of programs for upgrading SOA. The American position at the negotiations, which has been very thoroughly worked out with reference to the stage of a 50 percent reduction in SOA, bears the manifest imprint of opportunist, exclusively pragmatic considerations, which, were they to be followed, could lead far away from the main goal: a lessening of the likelihood of nuclear war.

What can the supporters of the so-called "political" school, who deny the need for a study of military specifics, say in this connection? No one needs any longer to be persuaded at the present stage that there could be no winners in a nuclear war and that agreements on deep cuts in SOA are essential. There is no need for prolix argument about the fact that political ways of ensuring security are preferable and that individual disproportions of the strategic balance must not become obstacles in the way of agreements whose significance for general security far exceeds the importance of individual asymmetries. The political leadership of the USSR has not only unequivocally stated its viewpoint on

these questions but has demonstrated in practice the resolve to abide by the principles of the new thinking, having achieved the signing of the INF Treaty.

But does this mean that any conditions of a 50 percent reduction in SOA are acceptable to the Soviet Union, particularly considering that there is as yet no mutual understanding between the parties concerning the next stage and ultimate goal of this path? Where is the boundary between permissible disproportions and serious "skewing" of the balance undermining stability? This is the terminus for "political lyric poetry," here it begins to walk in a closed circle of general phrases. A professional analysis of a multitude of specific issues is needed for further travel.

But perhaps diplomats and the military should be left to study the "pieces of iron" and tedious specifics, and the scientists left to solve truly major problems: such as to what extent is peace better than war and disarmament preferable to an arms race and policy from the viewpoint of security more important than military technology?

Such a division of labor would certainly make life far easier for the political scientists. But would it facilitate the development of a scientific basis for actual steps pertaining to a strengthening of security—that is the question. Experience shows that as soon as one switches from abstract argument to the specific ways and methods of the practical embodiment of ideas, it is necessary at once to speak about strategy, weapons systems and the material content of the "balance," "parity," "equal security," "stability" and other concepts.

On such issues the scientists' responsibility is incomparably higher, as also is the risk of error, than in arguments concerning high "political" matters. But it is here that the importance of serious scientific analysis and a firm theoretical base is more important than anywhere. However, it should consist not of streamlined wording suitable for all practical occasions and handsome in its infallibility and uselessness but be based both on a knowledge of most intricate specifics in all their contradictoriness and ambivalence and on broad conceptual thinking taking as the starting point the new philosophy of security and not confined to quotidian routine and departmental specifics. It is this demand which now puts statesmen in the category of scientists and experts enlisted in the elaboration of foreign policy.

But are the representatives of our academic community always on a par with these demands at the present time, when practice has, as they say, turned to face science directly? Not always and in all things, it has to be admitted. The years of stagnation, estrangement from practice, artificial isolation and self-isolation have taken their toll in this sphere. This applies to this extent or the other to the science of international politics as a whole and, most, to its military-political and disarmament



schools. Theoretical thought in this sphere was for many years covered by dense extraneous propaganda features and began to lose its capacity for independent, critical analysis.

Naturally, this has not gone unnoticed in the West, where an attentive watch is kept on our scientific publications and conclusions are drawn from discussions with representatives of Soviet science. This is what was written, for example, by the American specialist M. (Mayyer), a leader of MIT's Center for International Studies and a Pentagon consultant, explaining why he does not use the works of our scientists in his study of the military-political course of the USSR: "In the field in question here these authors have practically no information over and above what is published annually in the West in newspapers, journals and books (which serve as 'secret' sources to which they have open access). In addition, as academic representatives of the state, it is their special duty to justify official policy and portray it in the proper, that is, best, political and ideological light."<sup>15</sup>

An insulting opinion, of course. So I would like to repudiate it as a slander merely expressing the author's personal malevolence. Indeed, such a description is unduly indiscriminate and inapplicable to many Soviet scientists, who even in former times defended their own viewpoint as far as possible and have now joined actively in the tackling of urgent practical tasks. Other American experts are more objective in their assessments. Specifically, R. (Legvold), director of the A. Harriman Institute for Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University, observes that certain subdivisions in the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO and United States and Canada Institute are involved in close interaction with practical departments with far more important matters than pure propaganda.<sup>16</sup>

But, unfortunately, there is nonetheless a portion of truth even in the first opinion. It is not all up to the scientists, of course. A significant expansion of the publication of our own information, facts and evaluations, for example, without which scientific analysis is deprived of an elementary basis and is condemned to one-sidedness and isolation from real life. But nor are the representatives of the academic world always prepared to accept such information and integrate it in the system of profoundly considered concepts.

The Soviet Union understands this and is talking about it openly and setting the task of a fundamental change in the former state of affairs. Not, of course, to satisfy S. (Mayyer) and his ilk—their pronouncements are for us generally the least important problem. But primarily so that our theory correspond far more to the needs of Soviet foreign policy. As E.A. Shevardnadze pointed out, this "is no longer an idle demand but an iron necessity.

Inordinately active practice racing ahead of sluggish theory or sluggish, flaccid theory concerned with how to serve practice somewhat more craftily have at times cost us dear."<sup>17</sup>

#### Footnotes

1. See PRAVDA, 12 December 1987.
2. VESTNIK MID SSSR No 2, 26 August 1987, p 33.
3. See "Weapons in Space: Security Dilemma," edited by Ye.P. Velikhov, R.Z. Sagdeyev and A.A. Kokoshin, Moscow, 1986. "SDI: The American 'Star Wars' Program," USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for Assistance to Scientists, United States and Canada Institute and Space Research Institute, Moscow, 1987. "SDI: Dangers, Illusions, Alternative" (NOVOYE VREMYA, special supplement, 1987); "Disarmament and Security. 1986. Yearbook," Moscow, 1987.
4. See PRAVDA, 12 December 1987.
5. "Disarmament and Security. 1986. Yearbook," vol 2, p 202.
6. See PRAVDA, 24 January 1988.
7. See *ibid.*
8. See C. Gray, "Deterrence and Strategic Defense" ("The Strategic Defense Debate," edited by C. Snyder, Philadelphia, 1986, pp 170-182).
9. PRAVDA, 8 February 1988.
10. Estimated from PRAVDA, 17 March 1987.
11. PRAVDA, 17 January 1988.
12. It is a question of missile systems of the surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-ground, ship-to-ship and ship-to-air classes, aerial bombs, depth charges, torpedoes, ASW missiles, artillery projectiles, bombs and land mines and mortar systems. All told, the said systems at the present time number 5,000-10,000 boosters and delivery vehicles and more than 20,000 nuclear warheads.
13. The reference is to air force operational-tactical attack aircraft; base and carrier-based naval aircraft; air defense fighters and surface-to-air missiles; army tactical missiles and heavy artillery; large warships and submarines with missiles and dual-purpose torpedo and mortar shell arms.
14. See "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Reductions in Nuclear Arms," Moscow, 1987, p 13.



15. "Hawks, Doves and Owls," edited by G. Allison, A. Carnesale, J. Nye Jr., New York, 1985, p 169.

16. See THE HARRIMAN INSTITUTE FORUM, January 1988, p 7.

17. VESTNIK MID SSSR No 1, 5 August 1987, p 19.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya," 1988

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### World Reaction to INF Treaty

18160008d Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 4, Apr 88 pp 89-103

[International review: "Current Problems of World Politics (7 December 1987-29 February 1988)"]

[Text] Four months have elapsed since M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the United States. However, the Washington summit and its results are, as before, at the center of the attention of the world's press. Considering the higher-than-usual interest in this event, the editors decided to depart from the traditional analysis of current problems of international life, devoting the survey to the reaction to the Soviet-American summit of statesmen and politicians and government and scientific circles of various countries and the world community. We hope that this will enable the readers to obtain a fuller and more comprehensive idea of the significance of the meeting of the leaders of the two leading world powers.

### "You Can Do Business With Gorbachev"

What, precisely, did Americans consider the most important result of the top-level meeting in Washington? Primarily the very atmosphere of the negotiations. As TIME magazine put it, "Something extraordinary was happening: four decades of the frequently extremely sharp rhetoric of the cold war had given way to dispassionate discussion and mutual understanding at a high level. Neither party has forgotten the wide spectrum of ideological differences separating the superpowers, but they have learned to overcome their disagreements and seek common ground on which greater mutual understanding may be achieved." The American mass media were practically unanimous in their evaluation of the atmosphere in which M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Washington took place. "Warm personal relations. Thorough discussion of problems. Continuing differences, but at the same time progress also in the area of a new, more productive summit..." the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR wrote.

The summit took place against the background of pronounced changes in the mood of the American public. E. Prager wrote in the New York weekly VILLAGE

VOICE: "Last Wednesday television changed my view of the world forever. I saw the leader of the 'evil empire,' the herald of world domination, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the 'degraded' Soviet Union, who said on the steps of the White House: 'We must break the logic of the arms race... and choose between the fear and prejudice left over from the cold war and commonsense... stop the pointless waste of resources on weapons of destruction... and by the signing of the INF Treaty... detach this threat of nuclear war from an era of the demilitarization of the life of mankind.... We must proceed together toward a world free of nuclear weapons,' the enunciator of the 'red threat' declared, and inasmuch as it was he who was speaking in this way, I set to thinking about this for the first time.... For 3 days anti-Russian sentiments have been banned on the air. After a whole lifetime guided by anti-Sovietism, I considered this an experience clearing the convolutions of the brain. Which, simply put, made me feel happy."

Opinions concerning the results of the top-level Soviet-American negotiations differ considerably in the United States. Thus the extreme-right NEW YORK POST believes that Moscow was able to impose, predominantly for propaganda purposes, the agenda and course of the negotiations and derive one-sided benefits therefrom. The journal NEW AMERICAN, which is close to the J. Birch Society, carries letters from its readers in a state of panic at "R. Reagan's continuing betrayal of the United States expressed in the signing with M. Gorbachev of the INF Treaty." In another organ of the right—the journal NEW REPUBLIC—M. Kondracke shows that the overall results of the summit are negative for the United States (although not for its president), for the spectrum of the treaty is quite narrow, modest progress was made on strategic arms, on regional conflicts R. Reagan won only promises, M.S. Gorbachev won out in public relations and so forth. The conservative WALL STREET JOURNAL points to the right's dissatisfaction that the President failed to make the center of discussion such problems as human rights and emigration from the USSR, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and so forth. In criticism of the President the far right generally descended to crude personal abuse.

The JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL, the newspaper of business circles, believes that the signed INF Treaty is to a considerable extent of symbolic significance inasmuch as the main nuclear arms, of which there are sufficient to destroy the whole world, remain. The importance of this treaty lies elsewhere—in the hope that has emerged for new and better political and economic relations with the USSR based on realism. This thought is also developed by the journal BUSINESS WEEK. The treaty ushers in a period of most important changes in the relations of the two superpowers and a "transition from endless arms competition to the joint regulation of offensive and, possibly, defensive arms systems even."

A similar evaluation is shared by the majority of American correspondents. Many of them are also sympathetic

to the viewpoint of the administration, according to which the INF Treaty incorporates measures in the sphere of arms control of unprecedented breadth and completeness. "The provisions of the American-Soviet INF Treaty," the January issue of the military policy journal DEFENSE emphasizes, "are the most detailed and complete of all which have ever been incorporated in arms control agreements."

The results of M.S. Gorbachev's Washington visit met with full approval in progressive circles and democratic movements of the United States. There can be no serious discussion of a single problem raised at the summit, the liberal-left weekly THE NATION writes, without a display of good will and a desire to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the "Gorbachev era." The participants in the peace movement in the United States are speaking about the major peace offensive, which crowns the efforts of hundreds of thousands of fighters, but warn that the continuation of active public pressure is essential for the INF Treaty to be of more than just symbolic significance and for detente to continue to develop in line of ascent.

U.S. political circles consider a principal result of the Washington meeting the preparation of agreements in principle on the problem of strategic offensive arms (SOA), including the establishment of a sublevel of 4,900 warheads on ground- and sea-based missiles given overall ceilings of 6,000 warheads for all types of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

There were no breakthroughs in Washington, according to the influential weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, during discussion of a treaty on a strategic arms reduction (title abbreviated to START per the Roman initials). Nonetheless, certain progress was made—sufficient, the journal believes, for new impetus to the Geneva negotiations. It is commonly believed that the basic provisions of a future SOA limitation treaty were formulated and worked up. The American press emphasizes that an agreement on strategic systems would be of tremendous significance inasmuch as, whereas the INF Treaty is more important from the political than the military viewpoint, START would lead to a sharp reduction in the forces which have been a threat to peace for more than 40 years. The journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, which is close to military circles, categorizes as a potential breakthrough in the strategic arms sphere the two parties' agreement to include sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles in the control sphere.

There was success at the negotiations in Washington, as is known, in achieving a linkage between SOA cuts and compliance with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972 and nonwithdrawal therefrom for an agreed term. In this context experts emphasize the practical consent of the U.S. Administration to abandon the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

In the opinion of the journal NEWSWEEK, the advancement of the proposition concerning the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty is a "tactical subterfuge" of the Soviet Union geared to the achievement of its aims—the United States' abandonment of the SDI—indirectly. Providing its forecast of the future of the SDI, NEWSWEEK precludes neither the possibility of the demise of this project as a result of "a thousand budget cuts" on the part of Congress nor the fact that this program, in which \$10 billion have already been invested, could acquire a life of its own (which could allegedly permit R. Reagan to agree on this question to certain concessions at the next, Moscow, summit).

U.S. journalists and political correspondents express the assumption that following the conclusion of a START treaty the achievement, as the journal U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT put it, of subsequent phases of arms control could prove considerably more difficult. Voices have been heard to the effect that even now R. Reagan might not have sufficient time left before the end of his term to conduct negotiations on a more profound and diverse agreement.

An analysis of the prospects has been closely linked with comparisons of preceding stages of the development of Soviet-American relations. M. Mandelbaum called attention in the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT to the fact that in December 1987 it was seldom that anyone employed the word "detente." Nonetheless, the present stage of development of these relations is, he believes, its second period. It is expected to be longer than in the mid-1970's because the countries themselves have changed in the past 15 years, and both states have, what is more, learned historical lessons from the failures of that time. One such, from M. Mandelbaum's viewpoint, is the fact that "it is unrealistic to a considerable extent to expect that the Soviet economy will change by way of large injections of American capital, technology and expert analyses. In the 1970's the Soviets grasped the fact that trade and investments between East and West may develop only if political relations are tranquil; trade is limited by the fact that the Soviet economy does not produce much of what Americans are interested in; and that they will have to change their economy significantly...." However, business circles agree that arms control is an imperative both for the joint security and for the "economic activity" of the two sides.

Questions of the development of trade and economic ties between the two countries attracted great attention in the United States. "In holding on the final day of the top-level negotiations a meeting with prominent business representatives M. Gorbachev displayed his interest in an expansion of economic relations," the weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT commented. It was observed, inter alia, that during the visit M.S. Gorbachev was accompanied by three of the "most influential," as L. Silk, economic correspondent of the NEW YORK TIMES, put it, Soviet economists—A. Aganbegyan, V. Kamentsev and S. Sitaryan. However, despite

the optimism of G. Griffin, president of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC), who declared in an interview with the JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL the molding of new economic relations, U.S. business circles are of the opinion that changes in this sphere are as yet only just beginning. As distinct from their Soviet partners seeking the development of economic relations with the United States in every possible way, American businessmen are confining themselves as yet to comparatively small deals. Their cautiousness has been brought about by a number of factors. Primarily the discriminatory restrictions, which are particularly tough in instances associated with technology transfer. The difference of the parties' financial goals in economic projects is noted: American businessmen are interested in the assimilation of the potentially vast domestic market of the USSR, whereas the USSR allegedly aspires merely to the manufacture of export products to obtain foreign currency.

The key problem, however, as the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT emphasizes, is the incompatibility of the centralized planning of the Soviet economy and "free market principles." In this connection the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR points to the uncertainty of economic prospects and the conditions of activity: joint ventures would at the initial stage be unprofitable; socioeconomic issues (level of wages, social protection) are unclear; questions of the insurance of these ventures and raw material prices for them have not been decided; there are problems with the export of profits inasmuch as the ruble is nonconvertible.

However, all the enumerated problems could be solved, and the boldest American businessmen are already trying to find possible solutions. This quest has once again been buttressed by the authority of Dr A. Hammer. The expansion of trade and economic relations between the USSR and the United States is now gaining the support of official representatives of the U.S. Administration, primarily Secretary of Commerce W. Verity, a former chairman of the ASTEC, who, together with Secretary of State G. Shultz, is called the architect of the new phase of detente on the American side. Finally, the hesitation of U.S. business circles is gradually diminishing as a result of the high personal confidence in M.S. Gorbachev.

Analyzing the results of the December summit, political commentators note unanimously the profound impression which M.S. Gorbachev made on Americans. His book "Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the World," published simultaneously in the USSR and the United States, was greeted with great interest on the threshold of the visit to Washington. The CPSU general secretary's "unprecedented," in the assessment of the American mass media, interview with the American NBC national television company elicited extensive comment. The evolved negative stereotypes are being eroded and public opinion has begun to change fundamentally in the West under the impact of glasnost, perestroika and democratization in the USSR and the

bold and flexible foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union. This new atmosphere undoubtedly contributed to the success of the negotiations of the Soviet and American leaders. M.S. Gorbachev won popularity in the United States unprecedented for a foreign politician, for a Soviet politician all the more. Confirmation was TIME magazine's choice of M.S. Gorbachev as "man of the year." "I saw on television a normal Russian person," a female American journalist wrote, "and whatever happens in the future, I will never think about the Soviet Union as I did before." The Soviet leader's firm resolve to improve Soviet-American relations and achieve a decisive arms reduction won broad recognition in the United States.

U.S. political circles are emphasizing particularly the dynamism of the policy being pursued by M.S. Gorbachev: "Events have been developing so quickly in recent months," the WASHINGTON POST Sunday supplement observes, "that American officials have hardly had time to evaluate Gorbachev's new policy steps, not to mention respond intelligently to them."

The prevailing opinion among U.S. experts and politicians is that the Soviet leadership's new thinking is distinguished by realism, competence and flexibility: the CPSU general secretary has a mastery of the subject of the negotiations in all details, has in-depth and diverse knowledge of the world situation, has a better idea of the situation in the United States than American politicians have of the USSR and is prepared to discuss and negotiate, attempting to find mutually acceptable compromise. M. Zuckerman, chief editor of the weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, believes that M.S. Gorbachev's aspiration to arms reduction and a change in the Soviet Union's attitude toward the United States amounting to the fact that "the United States is seen not as a deadly enemy but a competitor and in many aspects as a partner even would seem sincere."

"Where is our own Gorbachev," was the title of an article by the well-known female journalist M. McGrory, who expresses concern in connection with the fact that none of the U.S. presidential candidates "can compare with Gorbachev intellectually." Similar statements may be heard from the camp of the right also, but there they are intended to substantiate the conclusion that Moscow alone has derived one-sided benefits from the Washington meeting.

The far right is not only criticizing the actual agreements reached as a result of the Soviet leader's visit to Washington. Also unacceptable to it are the trends which the December summit confirms: the equality and mutual respect of the two parties, which are the leaders of the two social systems; practical steps to ensure the on-going process of arms reduction; renunciation of any prior conditions, as, equally, the counterposing of different

directions of the struggle for a normalization of international relations given preservation of the priority of a halt to the arms race; the shifting of the political axis in the United States from the right toward the center.

The U.S. mass media was highlighting this last aspect back at the time of the preparation for the top-level meeting. The journal *NEWSWEEK* observed that as it drew nearer, the right was "causing Reagan more trouble than the Russians." Simultaneously, the *WASHINGTON POST* points out, "the influence of the conservatives in the Reagan administration has diminished constantly.... The resignation of Defense Secretary C. Weinberger and the appointment in his place of F. Carlucci removed the last convinced supporter of a hard line from the upper echelons of government. In order to emphasize this fact Carlucci removed Pentagon arms specialist F. Gaffney, who symbolized the skeptical attitude in the United States toward arms treaties between the superpowers."

Political commentators recognize that the success of the top-level meeting in Washington would have been impossible had the U.S. Administration not displayed a readiness to go its part of the way to accommodate the Soviet proposals. In particular, this approach made it possible to overcome a number of technical slips in the period of preparation of the meeting in connection, for example, with the submittal of photographs of the missiles to be destroyed. A remark which R. Reagan made to his spokesman M. Fitzwater, who declared at a briefing that "it is not old friends but old enemies who are meeting," did not go unnoticed. M. Fitzwater publicly acknowledged that what should have been said was not enemies but rivals. They emphasize also that the President was very timely in starting the campaign in support of the agreements which were being prepared and that on the eve of M.S. Gorbachev's visit he publicly described the opponents of the INF Treaty as uninformed people, by which he evoked the stormy anger of some of his former supporters.

A concentrated campaign against the Soviet-American accords was initiated by ultra-conservative organizations of the United States such as the American Defense Committee, the Coalition for Peace from a Position of Strength, the Coalition for America, the American Conservative Union and others. The Soviet-American meeting revealed and to a certain extent sharply accelerated the process of a demarcation of forces in the ranks of the Republican Party and the entire conservative camp. Several basic points of dissatisfaction of the forces of the conservative right may be distinguished.

A group of political figures (former secretaries of state H. Kissinger and A. Haig, J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. permanent representative at the United Nations, and K. Adelman, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) is constantly seeking to prove that the INF Treaty leaves the United States' West European allies vulnerable in the face of the "Soviet threat,"

consolidates Warsaw Pact superiority and undermines allied relations in NATO, while the two classes of missiles scheduled for elimination are of no particular significance in the nuclear arsenal. Close positions are occupied by C. Weinberger, R. Perle and F. Gaffney. They maintain that owing to the abridged timeframe of the work on the treaty and the tremendous pressure at the final stage of the negotiations, mistakes crept into it, the chief of which is the absence of firm assurances of compliance therewith on the part of the Soviet Union, and this assumes particular significance in the light of the SOA negotiations.

The most widespread and acute dissatisfaction among the right was caused by the actions of R. Reagan, who uncoupled the INF Treaty from linkages involving concessions on the part of the USSR on human rights, emigration and regional problems. Rightwing conservatives have not lost hope of making good what was let slip through the insertion in the treaty of amendments. Some would like here to link it, for example, with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, while others (like the said J. Kirkpatrick) have proposed the incorporation therein—and in subsequent agreements—of an article concerning an automatic suspension of the treaty in the event of noncompliance with its terms.

Finally, one further group is an openly obstructionist one which includes the ultra-conservative senators J. Helms and S. Symms, figures of the far right like H. Phillips and R. Viguerie and others. Following the round of negotiations, lost, they believe, they propose the abandonment of any agreements with the Soviet Union at all.

The loud accusations of the far right sounded manifestly discordant against the background of the recognition by the vast majority of Americans of the results of the Washington summit. A situation has taken shape wherein many prominent conservatives, while expressing essential reservations both in respect of the INF Treaty and other results of the meeting, have been unable to simply ignore the opinion of their electorate, the more so in presidential election year. They have defended R. Reagan and his administration against the criticism of political extremists of the right, understanding, in the words of the influential conservative *NATIONAL JOURNAL*, that "in opposing the INF Treaty the right is once again isolating itself from the political mainstream."

In rejecting the agreements reached by the USSR and the United States the ultra-conservatives are attempting, the majority of observers believes, to resist further agreements between the two countries, preparing for a broad-based struggle against an SOA treaty. The U.S. *NEWS AND WORLD REPORT* viewed their attacks on R. Reagan as an attempt to rally forces for the future decisive battle.

Conservatives are extremely worried that an SOA agreement will lead to the complete or partial renunciation of the SDI, which they equate with a symbol of a "strong America." The position of the administration itself on this question amounts to one of preserving the SDI while continuing negotiations on offensive arms. Immediately following the Washington meeting, the President maintained in a talk with provincial newspaper editors on 11 December that the SDI question had been "settled" at the negotiations. In response to the questions which followed the administration had to give official explanations as to what was actually agreed and how. However, all of them bore out here the administration's devotion to the SDI concepts and explained that, as C. Powell, the President's national security adviser, put it, it was not a "bargaining counter."

Two camps have taken shape within the ruling Republican Party—those who, as the WASHINGTON POST put it, give priority to international cooperation to reduce nuclear arsenals and those who consider "the Soviet system so hateful and invariable that the United States must maintain unconditional nuclear superiority". The arms control problem has become, many observers believe, a determining issue in the 1988 election campaign. The attacks of the extreme right wing on the INF Treaty could, they believe, play into the Democrats' hands and lead to part of the electorate deserting the Republicans. Conversely, ratification of the INF treaty and progress at the SOA negotiations would lead to a strengthening of President R. Reagan's positions and deprive the Democrats of a powerful trump card.

Of the Republican contenders for official presidential candidate, Vice President G. Bush and Senator R. Dole have declared their support for the top-level Soviet-American agreements; in the Democratic Party all the contenders support these agreements. In addition, some of them are insisting on the insertion of a new factor associated with the USSR in the election campaign. Thus Governor M. Dukakis is calling on Americans to elect as president a person of wide erudition and well informed who might be on a par with M.S. Gorbachev and could tackle positively with him most important issues of world development.

The positions of the contenders from both parties are being tested at so-called primaries, and additional changes will probably be made to them here. The results of the primaries which have been held prevent as yet a conclusive forecast. However, as the journal BUSINESS WEEK emphasizes, the influence of the INF Treaty will be felt long after the elections. Whoever occupies the Oval Office after the present president, energetic progress in the process of the establishment of arms control will be expected of him."

The positions which have come to light and the struggle in the course of the hearings on the INF Treaty in the U.S. Congress would seem indicative. The President officially submitted the treaty to the Senate on 25

January 1988, timing this event to coincide with the annual State of the Union address and thereby emphasizing the importance of the document and the lawmakers' responsibility. The mass media and political pundits have been asking whether the President will succeed in having the Senate ratify the treaty in the form in which it was signed, without amendments distorting its meaning.

The paradox of the current situation is, as the majority of observers have noted, that the most emphatic support for the INF Treaty has come not from the President's party but from the opposition Democratic Party.

Its Senate faction formed a coordinating group for a close analysis of all aspects of the treaty. It included Democratic Majority Leader R. Byrd and C. Pell, S. Nunn and D. Boren, chairmen of the three Senate committees (Foreign Relations, Armed Services and the Special Committee on Intelligence), who made a preliminary study of the treaty. On the eve of the summit Sen A. Cranston began negotiations with the Republican faction leadership, and Sen J. Biden, who is chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, made at the behest of C. Pell a tour of West European countries, where he held meetings with H. Kohl, F. Mitterrand, M. Thatcher, foreign ministers, defense ministers and also other West European statesmen and politicians. His mission was to ascertain the position of the United States' allies in respect of the treaty. In mid-January J. Biden, at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, visited Moscow and was received by A.A. Gromyko. For his part, R. Dole, leader of the Republican minority in the Senate, formed a coordinating group of Republican members of the said committees.

The group of senators which attempted to openly reject the Soviet-American accords arrived at in Washington proved very small. For this reason political observers have little doubt that the treaty will be signed and that its examination in the Senate committees will not drag on for long. Strictly speaking, immediately after it had been received in the Senate, according to the NEW YORK TIMES, some senators were expressing the opinion that the INF Treaty had in practice already been ratified inasmuch as NATO had announced that it would no longer play host to new American missiles. The author of this article, (S. Raski), declared that at the center of the debate was not so much ratification of the treaty itself as the question of how to restructure the West's defense system given the remaining nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons.

An issue which has been extensively debated in the U.S. press and on television is: in what form will the treaty be ratified? The opponents of the treaty have attempted to take advantage of the peculiar features of the ratification procedure, in accordance with which both amendments of a binding nature and those regarded as expressing the "will of the Senate" may by simple majority be inserted at any stage of the discussion. The latter do not entail changes to the wording of the treaty and may be turned

down by the President. On the other hand, the Senate's adoption of an amendment to the wording of the treaty would mean new negotiations with the USSR to draw up the corresponding protocol to the treaty. Experts have not precluded the possibility of the advancement of so-called "killer amendments" either emasculating the content of the document or dragging out its discussion indefinitely.

The most emphatically minded was the right wing of the Republican Party—J. Helms, L. Pressler, M. Wallop and S. Symms. Thus L. Pressler demanded linkage of ratification of the treaty with the removal of the "imbalance" in conventional arms in Europe and with the situation in the field of human rights in the USSR and also the destruction of warheads together with the missiles and launchers and the right of unrestricted inspection of any facility on USSR territory at any time at the demand of the United States. As the WASHINGTON POST reported, J. Helms declared that the Senate should not "become bogged down in the technical complexities of problems of verification" and demanded a "study of all aspects of Soviet-American relations" inasmuch as it was "absolutely essential to amend" the treaty.

At the end of January Sen J. Helms submitted a wordy memorandum which criticized many provisions of the INF agreements and attempted to dispute the authenticity of certain photographs of the Soviet missiles to be destroyed. In addition, the NEW YORK TIMES believes, while avoiding the formulation of amendments to the treaty directly, J. Helms engaged in backstage maneuvers, urging Representative J. Kemp (who was seeking nomination as presidential candidate) to conduct a public struggle. M. Wallop attempted to play up the subject of the Soviet Union's violations of previous treaties, declaring that the INF Treaty contains provisions governing verification, but that "nothing is said about measures to ensure compliance with the agreement."

During discussion of the treaty in the Senate a group which for quite some time was unable to formulate its final positions was clearly defined also. Expressing doubts concerning the verification procedures, one of its representatives, D. Quayle, also tended toward support for amendments taking into consideration the imbalance in the sphere of conventional arms. At the same time, however, the NEW YORK TIMES quoted him as saying, he aspired "to improve the positive features of this treaty and prevent negative precedents with regard for future treaties." A number of senators had questions pertaining to the technical aspects of arms control. For example, doubts were expressed on the part of J. Glenn concerning the possibility of ensuring the necessary monitoring of fissionable materials.

In addition, observers believe, the personal political ambitions of somehow linking their name with the treaty or settling accounts with the administration were

revealed in certain Senate members. Finally, the BOSTON GLOBE maintained, the treaty's supporters—Democrats and, possibly, several Republicans—devised certain strategic countermeasures: the basis thereof were "forestalling declarations," subtly formulated reservations which contained the same misgivings as the "killer amendments," but which are of a nonbinding nature here.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in support of ratification of the INF Treaty which began on 25 January were addressed by Secretary of State G. Shultz, M. Kampelman, leader of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva negotiations, and other officials. "The INF Treaty strengthens international stability," G. Shultz observed in his speech. "It could be the start of a new stage in the arms control process, in which there are arms reductions."

The hearings which began the same day in the Senate Armed Services Committee also started with a positive discussion. Defense Secretary F. Carlucci and Adm W. Crowe, chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who spoke, evaluated the treaty positively as a whole and expressed the hope that it would be approved by the Senate. At the same time they advocated in their speeches the need for subsequent negotiations with the USSR from a position of strength and called for the modernization of the armed forces of the United States and NATO. The position of these officials reflected the intricate maneuvering to which the administration had resorted.

The inconsistency of the political actions of the present U.S. Administration defined by both the contradictoriness of its foreign policy goals and the ideological pressure of conservative forces within the country and by the vacillation of the ruling circles of the United States' NATO allies was expressed also in an interview which R. Reagan gave the WASHINGTON POST on 26 February 1988. He questioned here the possibility of the formulation of a draft treaty on a 50-percent cut in SOA within a timeframe permitting its signing during the President's visit to the USSR at the end of May-start of June. This assessment is contrary to the accords arrived at in December 1987 at the Washington meeting and is at odds with the frame of mind which characterized the talks and negotiations of U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz during his visit to Moscow in February 1988. In a comment on the President's interview the Soviet side emphasized the USSR's readiness to make every effort to complete the work on the corresponding documents by the time of the next meeting of the leaders of the USSR and the United States.

As a whole, the assessments of the results of the meeting in Washington testify that the majority of Americans welcomes the normalization of relations between the USSR and the United States and advocates continuing

movement being imparted to this process. The successful completion of R. Reagan's upcoming visit to Moscow would correspond to these interests.

#### West Europe: In Favor, But...

The results of the Washington summit have been the subject of lively debate in West Europe, a region occupying, by virtue of its geostrategic and political position, a special place in the modern world. The treaty signed by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States has lent extra keenness to the arguments concerning fundamental, from West Europeans' viewpoint, problems of security. At the center of attention have been such questions as the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring European security, Washington's "nuclear umbrella" or, in other words, the United States' nuclear guarantees, the interbloc correlation in conventional arms and armed forces, measures to "compensate" for the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, elimination of which is envisaged by the treaty, and a number of others. A concurrence of views (at intergovernmental level, at least) has been ascertained in respect of some of them, others have brought to light differences, fundamental at times even. While positive as a whole, West Europeans' response has at the same time been equivocal also.

The debate which has encompassed social and political forces of West European countries has in each of them had its own singularities largely determined by traditional views on two problems—Europe's place in the modern world (and, correspondingly, the place of one's country in Europe and the world) and Europe's destiny (and, correspondingly, the degree of responsibility of this country or the other for the future of the region).

The evaluations of the Washington meeting have made it possible to also reveal more or less precisely an initial common base in the wide spectrum of opinions and judgments. The basis thereof is the view of Europe's changed role in the modern system of interstate relations. An article by A. Grosse, professor at the Paris Policy Research Institute, in issue No 8 of the survey "West European Countries" (1987) might serve as an illustration of such an approach (with certain reservations, it is true). We are already accustomed to the fact, he observes, that the life of West Europe has since 1973 developed under the influence of outside stresses: from the oil crisis through the American decisions on defense problems. And these external events are influencing the internal life of the region more strongly almost than leaders' decisions or the behavior of the electorate. The author returns constantly to the idea of the dependence of European development on world development, affirming regretfully that the times of "the world's broad dependence" on Europe have passed. Europe is now trying to solve problems posed by others.

A. Grosse distinguishes particularly two factors of this increased dependence. The first is the change in Washington's attitude toward Europe. Whereas in the

cold war period political motives in the American position outweighed economic ones, as of the 1970's the United States has been switching to a policy of "our money and our economy first." The second is the increased "presence" of the USSR both in transatlantic and domestic political relations in West Europe and the USSR's "most outstanding diplomatic offensive." In A. Grosse's opinion, the most important aspect of this offensive for Europe is the appeal for the deliverance of the Earth from nuclear weapons.

The author's statements are not generally a cause for objection. However, his conclusions would seem contentious, at least. Anticipating, as it were, the evaluation of the treaty, A. Grosse believes that it will ultimately reduce the risk of nuclear war and catastrophe in Europe, but at the same time, however, increases the possibility of conventional war not only by virtue of the USSR's "superiority" in conventional arms but also on account of the existence in Europe (West Berlin) and alongside it (the Near East) of "flash points" capable of detonating a third world war.

One further common point which can, perhaps, be detected in the commentaries of many West European news media is the subject of an "abandoned," "forsaken" Europe. Warnings against a "new Yalta," a "compact of the two great powers at Europe's expense" and such like have once again appeared in the press of West European countries. "Incapable of adopting its own position in respect of most important problems (from 'star wars'... through the 'zero option,' which it met with ovations and groans)," the Italian PAESE SERA complained, "Europe is now more than ever out of the game, torn between the temptation of autonomous nuclear retroarmament and the sloth of an increasingly subordinate position and has become a political entity without ideas and without soul bogged down in trifling internal disputes."

The propositions concerning the growing likelihood of a conventional war and an "abandoned" and "lost" Europe have gained the greatest currency in political and military circles of West Europe. They might seem to us to be an attempt to cash in. But this does not alter the real fact that it is these that they are using not only for appeals but also practical steps aimed at preventing the "denuclearization" of Europe and also winning so-called "compensation measures."

Even prior to the meeting of the Soviet and American leaders British Prime Minister M. Thatcher gave a warning that following the conclusion between the USSR and the United States of an agreement on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear forces and, possibly, an agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms, "no more nuclear arms should be taken from Europe's arsenal until we have achieved equalization (with the Soviet Union—authors) in conventional arms and are persuaded of the possibility of the creation of a system of verification."



British political circles link the treaty between the USSR and the United States directly with a strengthening of NATO. Thus an editorial article in THE INDEPENDENT for 10 December entitled "Restructuring of Nuclear Forces in NATO" emphasizes that the hopes born of the treaty conceal as yet Europeans' considerable anxiety apropos the consequences. The statements of the country's prime minister are, the paper believes, evidence of this. Instead of conducting a hopeless struggle to persuade public opinion that the deployment of air- and sea-launched nuclear missiles in the European theater as "compensation" is in keeping with the spirit of the treaty, THE INDEPENDENT recommends definition of NATO's minimal requirements to deter aggression. Having formulated this definition, the paper emphasizes, and embarked on the deployment of the new systems—almost certainly some version of air-launched reserve missiles—NATO could rid itself of thousands of battle-field nuclear systems.

The paper supports M. Thatcher's insistence that the nuclear deterrent weapons at NATO's disposal must not be weakened in the absence of equal limits on conventional forces in Europe.

The "concern" in West European capitals in connection with the consequences of the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is indicated by THE GUARDIAN, emphasizing particularly West Germans' anxiety that "almost all nuclear weapons (tactical—authors) left in Europe following implementation of the treaty will be on German soil or targeted at it." The British prescription is simple. "Now, when the American nuclear umbrella has not been folded away but is being withdrawn to the other side of the Atlantic," THE GUARDIAN observes, "Westminster is speaking of the preservation of West European deterrent weapons by way of the modernization or replacement of the remaining nuclear arms." In addition, even if the USSR and the United States reach an agreement on a strategic arms reduction, Britain's "independent nuclear deterrent forces" will not, THE INDEPENDENT emphasized, be incorporated therein for "a very long time."

Britain, like France, refuses to have its nuclear potential considered in the negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons and is certain of the need to modernize the nuclear forces to ensure the effectiveness of the deterrent forces. However, the evaluations of the treaty in Britain are, for the most part, positive, on the whole. Thus foreign and defense secretaries G. Howe and G. Younger distributed among British members of parliament a letter which emphasized that the achievement of the Soviet-American agreement corresponds to the interests of Britain's security and sets an important precedent for future negotiations.

D. Mellor, minister of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, observed that the Soviet-American treaty affords new opportunities for the successful advancement of the process of negotiations on a reduction in

nuclear arms. In turn, Labor Party spokesman G. Kaufman pointed out that the parliamentary opposition wholly welcomes the conclusion of the agreement and sees it as a manifestation of good will and commonsense on the part of the USSR and the United States. Regrettable merely is the fact that the British Government has not made its contribution to this process, more, has embarked on "unilateral nuclear retroarmament," having begun implementation of the Trident program.

As the recent statements of M. Thatcher show, Great Britain understands this contribution in a highly distinctive manner. Speaking on the centenary of the Foreign Press Association in London on 13 January, the prime minister gave as the reason for the agreement "the perseverance and resolve with which we are defending our way of life." She assigned NATO a special role. "I am wholly and fully in favor of the European countries strengthening their cooperation in the sphere of defense," M. Thatcher emphasized. This cooperation should be geared to support for NATO and assist the defense of Europe as a whole. A special part here, according to the prime minister, will be played by the strengthening of the bilateral relations of France and the FRG and France and Great Britain, if it "manifestly contributes to a strengthening of NATO and does not undermine its unity."

In the FRG, which, as is known, contributed to the achievement of the accord on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the results of the Washington summit have been evaluated positively, as a whole.

In an interview with the journal WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE FRG Foreign Minister H.D. Genscher emphasized that "some skeptics in the West are having great difficulty parting with old clichéd ideas. We have to decide: either by way of cooperation to ensure the survival of mankind or to perish in a fight with one another. Considering this prospect, I urge a serious attitude toward Gorbachev and his policy of reforms and with the help of new thinking, among us included, an opening of the way to a policy of cooperation in the field of security also.... So why should we not sensibly and realistically be doing everything in order with mutual benefit... to take advantage of the opportunities afforded as a result of his new thinking and new policy?"

The West German minister observed that the ruling coalition was unanimous on questions of security, as also on "the question of the urgent need for negotiations to establish a balance in the sphere of conventional arms such that no one have the capacity for invasion and surprise attack. And all the coalition partners—indeed, all parties of the Bundestag—want the policy of arms control to extend to short-range missiles also."

To a certain extent this unanimity indicates the common analysis of FRG political circles (but not the conclusions): Germans, according to DIE WELT, following the withdrawal of weapons performing the role of deterrent



factor, will still be sitting on "powder kegs" of short-range weapons and nuclear artillery, which threaten them alone. However, there ensue from the relatively unanimous analysis two conclusions—an aspiration to a continuation of the detente process and an unconcealed attempt "to compensate for the disarmament" of Europe thanks to intrinsic European forces.

All this, the press believes, makes it possible to speak of the "particular course" of the FRG (and the need "to insist on the true path" of the Germans). The French journal *LE POINT* carried an article in January about the fact that "whereas Paris is extolling Franco-German cooperation, the FRG is stimulating its Ostpolitik."

Conservative forces in West Europe have once again discerned behind the Soviet-American agreement and the "vacillation" of the FRG the specter of a "triple zero option," which NATO has already officially rejected. The Americans and the British, not to mention the French, advocate the preservation and modernization of short-range weapons. They fear Europe's "nuclear disarmament," which, with regard for the present correlation of forces in the conventional arms sphere, would have a "destabilizing impact." Many people in the FRG, to judge by everything, find this position to their liking. They are not averse, moreover, in the guise of concern for the fate of a "disarmed Europe," to gaining access to joint European or their own nuclear weapons and going even further in the field of military cooperation with France.

West European conservatives may count on Paris in this respect with every confidence. As the newspaper *QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS* observed, President Mitterrand would like to avail himself of the consequences of the Washington treaty to persuade his Western partners to reconsider "deterrence doctrine," having renounced the principle in effect currently in the Atlantic alliance of "flexible response." As the paper affirms, in the course of a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary F. Carlucci (after the Soviet-American agreement had been signed) the president said that NATO doctrine provides in the event of a conflict for the possibility of an incremental exchange of nuclear strikes in Europe. However, the president believes, such a doctrine is unacceptable to Europe, and for this reason it is necessary to return to the principle of deterrence based on the threat of an all-out retaliatory strike. F. Mitterrand made it understood that the INF Treaty should lead to NATO revising its strategy, bringing it closer to the French viewpoint. This treaty, he said, "permits a return to the true principle of deterrence based on long-range weapons capable of hitting enemy territory directly."

The position of the French president and his recent proposals are a development of France's traditional approach to problems of nuclear weapons, security and East-West relations. In a letter to *LE MONDE* on 4 December L. Jospin, first secretary of the French Socialist Party, supported the Soviet-American agreement, but

upheld the country's official position on the need for preservation of its own nuclear forces at a sufficient level. In principle he reiterated the rejection of France's involvement in NATO's nuclear doctrine ("flexible response") since the country has its own policy of "nuclear deterrence." However, this approach is shared by far from everyone in circles of France's rightwing conservative forces. Thus P. Fillon, chairman of the National Assembly Defense Commission, declared plainly in an interview with the weekly *LE POINT* that in signing the treaty Reagan was "at odds with his allies, has left them confused and has spread among the American public the illusion of the possibility of the conversion of Europe into a nuclear-free zone."

In the same interview Fillon criticized the U.S. President for softness, emphasizing that "the sole positive result of these negotiations is, I believe, the changes which they make to concepts and doctrines and also Europeans' recognition of the unreliability of their strategic position and the need to rely not only on the older American brother but on themselves." In his opinion, France cannot remain indifferent to such a turn of events, and the independence of its military policy "must not be a synonym for neutrality." In this connection he demanded the all-around consolidation of military cooperation in West Europe and a strengthening of NATO and the Western European Union as the European pillar of the North Atlantic bloc. Specifically, Fillon proposed support for a Eureka military program, the formation of mixed Franco-West German military structures and the development of "new forms of cooperation in the nuclear sphere," primarily with Great Britain.

Former French Premier R. Barre, who chose as his platform the *QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS*, pursued the same ideas, only with more muted accents, perhaps. On 4 December the paper carried a report of his speech in Lyons, where he emphasized that "a trend toward Europe's nuclear disarmament, which can only increase our continent's vulnerability, is being observed." He is concerned for the fate of France's nuclear forces and urges an increase in military spending and "Europeans taking the business of providing for their own security into their own hands." Several days later (11 December) Barre repeated his proposition concerning Europe's defenselessness—"the agreement has been signed, and the United States' will has been imposed on its NATO partners.... I would like," he declared, "the Community countries to be able to step up cooperation in defense. Since defense will always ultimately be an intrastate business I would like France to make the necessary efforts aimed at ensuring that its deterrent force and nonnuclear forces be modern, effective and reliable."

A campaign of "reservations and doubts" literally engulfed the French press. On 7 December alone—the day of the start of the visit to Washington—the *QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS* carried material under the heading "This Treaty Is Dangerous," *LE PARISIEN*, the article "Europe Finds Itself Utterly Powerless in the Face of the

Two Giants," LIBERATION, "Meeting With a Double Meaning" and so forth. Even after the signing of the treaty, official circles' "satisfaction" was accompanied by endless reservations. In an interview with the West German PASSAUER NEUE PRESSE French Foreign Minister J.-B. Raymond spoke of the need "to find a suitable framework for European defense in order to reach agreement on joint principles of security and, following this, give this defense concrete form."

One such joint "joint principle" may be discerned clearly enough. Speaking in the National Defense Institute on 17 December, Premier J. Chirac declared that "Britain and France, which know from historical experience that deterrence in Europe cannot be ensured by conventional nonnuclear weapons alone, must necessarily maintain the priority which they give—and perfectly justifiably—to their nuclear deterrent forces, while not forgoing here means for actions on the international scene which also contribute to European security." In this speech Chirac charted three priority directions of France's activity—a strengthening of bilateral relations with Britain, an extension of cooperation with the FRG and fruitful political and military cooperation with Spain and Italy. As M. (Kolomes), political correspondent of the weekly LE POINT, observed, both the president and the premier are saying "the same thing differently." (Kolomes') comment becomes increasingly understandable if it is recalled that France is in the throes of an election campaign, in which Mitterrand, Chirac and Barre are competitors.

With certain "reservations" the Soviet-American treaty has been approved in Italy also. And the "reservations" are, correspondingly, the same. The Italian journalist F. Mussi wrote in this connection that "here in Italy we have a defense minister who in his tiny domain is intimidating people with the prospect of a Europe which is more defenseless and subject to greater danger." With the help of various authorities attempts are being made in Italy to create the impression that the USSR will never agree to full parity and that as a result until the Soviet Union consents to an equalization of conventional arms, nuclear weapons and the "deterrent forces" of Britain and France on the continent will remain.

However, quite interesting evaluations are encountered also. Thus the commentator A. Gambino observes that the basis of the reservations being put forward by many governments and pressure groups is the assertion concerning the danger of the "denuclearization" of Europe—"an effective, but hollow argument." Primarily because even if Great Britain and France are excluded, it will never be "deprived of nuclear weapons"—even without the Euromissiles it has and will continue to have tactical nuclear systems. And if it is considered that the defense of Europe is secured by the strategic nuclear weapons of the United States, the author concludes that even following the agreement West Europe's position will in this sense remain unchanged.

A. Gambino emphasizes that after the Europeans had for a long time stuck to this absurd argument, they suddenly swiftly relented, declaring their satisfaction with the agreement. And this would indicate that they have both learned nothing and understood nothing for entrusting one's defense to a third party is not only an undignified but also very dangerous option. This was the predominant line, seemingly, of Italian press comment.

The positions adopted by the North European countries were distinguished by a certain unique quality. Their reaction was largely determined by the fact that they saw the Soviet-American agreements as an opportunity for the realization of a whole set of proposals concerning a strengthening of security in this region, a most important part of which was composed of the new peace initiatives of the USSR contained in M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk.

Sweden links the state of affairs in North Europe with realization of the accord between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Speaking in the course of a general policy debate in the Riksdag on 20 October 1987, G. Johansson, chairman of the Center Party, observed plainly: "it is now very important that the elimination of the missiles... in Europe not entail a growth of tension and a risk of confrontation in the northern parts of Scandinavia and the North Atlantic." In turn, M.B. Theorin, the head of the Swedish delegation at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, pointed directly to the danger that the removal of nuclear weapons from the ground could be compensated by sea-launched cruise missiles. In this connection he advocated the need for the formulation of an agreement limiting sea-launched nuclear missiles.

It may obviously be said that the North European countries greeted the Murmansk initiatives with great interest and, what is very important, with practical interest. Sweden, P. Schori, general secretary of the Foreign Ministry, pointed out on 8 October, supports "balanced development as far as concerns the presence of the great powers" in the seas of North Europe. According to him, "the increased American presence in the Norwegian Sea does not signify an inordinate force buildup," but nor does Sweden "desire a situation like the Mediterranean, with the permanent naval patrolling of the great powers." Speaking on the question of a ban on naval activity in mutually agreed zones, Lt Gen S.O. Olsson, commander of the Swedish Air Force, declared that the Swedish side considers an essential factor the seas' continued free international status simultaneously with the limitation of military activity in them. Commenting on the Soviet proposals, the Finnish president observed that they express support for ideas advanced earlier by Helsinki pertaining to questions of security in the European North. M. Koivisto pointed to the important role of corridors free of arms and the need for the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, in North Europe included.

The country also links problems of a strengthening of security in this part of the region, as the speeches of Finland's statesmen and politicians testify, with the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe. Fears have been expressed repeatedly in Helsinki that the United States and its NATO allies might attempt to "compensate" for the elimination of missiles of these classes by an arms buildup in sea areas, in the North included. As Foreign Minister K. Sorsa pointed out in a speech, sea-launched cruise missiles, which are not covered by the INF Treaty, are a factor capable of exerting a negative influence on the security of North Europe.

Nor has Denmark remained aloof from the discussion of problems of the North's security. However, its position, to judge by a statement of Prime Minister P. Schluter, amounts to the fact that the best means for promoting a relaxation of tension here is increased trust between the great powers leading to arms reductions.

As the country's prime minister G.H. Brundtland declared on this subject, Norway also is concerned that naval activity not lead to increased tension. "We received with interest the proposals put forward by Finland for a strengthening of confidence-building measures in the northern seas and are studying the existing such proposals." However, Norway closely links a solution of the region's problems with general disarmament problems. On the question of the creation of a nuclear-free zone the government believes that it "should be a part of a broader European system and correspond to Norway's status as a member of the NATO Western bloc. Such a zone could contribute to a lessening of the significance of nuclear weapons in Europe's security policy and a strengthening of peace and the preservation of stability in the North."

A speech on 3 January to students of the military academy by Norwegian Defense Minister J.J. Holst, in which he explained the aims of the country's defense policy, enable us to acquire a more comprehensive idea of Norway's position. The minister emphasized that, first, the treaty between the USSR and the United States does not undermine NATO's "flexible response" strategy since the intermediate-range missiles were made a part of this strategy only following their deployment. Second, there is no need, in his opinion, for the achievement of a separate strategic balance between East and West Europe since West Europe is a part of the overall balance of forces. American participation and American protection are the principal components in the safeguarding of European security. Third, Holst believes, the principles laid down in the Soviet-American agreement, of a "symmetrical reduction," in particular, may be employed at future negotiations. And, finally, the minister called on the West to forgo demands for compensation of the potential of the missiles to be destroyed thanks to other types of weapons. "I find it hard to understand," he declared, "how it is possible to justify the demand for compensation if it is considered that,

first, realization of the treaty will lead to a strengthening of security in Europe and, second, in accordance with the treaty, the Soviet Union will destroy far more weapons than we in the West."

The diversity of the opinions and views which accompanied the discussion in West Europe of the results of the Soviet-American summit negotiations by no means signifies their underestimation and a negative attitude toward them. The majority of West European politicians, military figures and scientists and the public have supported the treaty signed in Washington. And this is the main thing. The elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles changes and cannot fail to change not only the military situation but also the political and also psychological atmosphere on the continent. The new situation demands new solutions and approaches. The "reservations" and recommendations and prescriptions in a spirit of "compensation for the disarmament" which are being offered currently in NATO countries bear the imprint of the old thinking. However, the interests of European security and the continent's future demand not unilateral rash retroarmament "initiatives" but seriously considered further joint steps to reduce the danger of the outbreak of war taking into account the mutual unease and continued distrust between West and East.

#### **The Developing Countries—Equal Participants in the System of International Security**

The signing of the INF Treaty in the course of the Washington summit has been actively supported by the vast majority of "third world" countries. Recognition of the historical and political significance of the agreement as the start of real disarmament, nuclear primarily, was heard in the speeches of the presidents of Nicaragua, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Cameroon and Mali and in the speeches of statesmen and politicians of other Asian, African and Latin American countries. The results of the Soviet-American top-level meeting were welcomed by the nonaligned movement, AAPSO and the OAU. "The USSR and the United States have taken an unprecedented step forward in disarmament negotiations in the postwar period," a correspondent of the Pakistani journal THE HERALD believes.

There has been a pronounced shift in the "third world" in the mid-1980's in ideas concerning the reality of the nuclear threat both at the level of the mass consciousness and in political circles. The belief, which was earlier quite prevalent in a number of emergent states, that remoteness from the focal point of a possible outbreak of a nuclear conflict would protect them against the devastating consequences of the use of weapons of mass annihilation is receding into the background. The extensive comment which the INF Treaty has elicited in the developing countries testifies that the central problem of the era—the preservation of peace—has ceased to be a secondary issue for these states also.

The results of the Washington meeting are welcomed in the developing world as an expression of the great powers' mutual trust and evidence of the ongoing break with the old stereotypes. This evaluation has been heard in the speeches of politicians of African states, the "front-line" states primarily and also of Mali, Mauritania, Ethiopia and Madagascar. The same viewpoint is put forward in the mass media of Asian countries. In the opinion of the Indian NATIONAL HERALD, "the Washington meeting marks the appearance of new trends on the international scene which are bringing cooperation in place of confrontation and replacing suspicion with mutual trust." Recognition of the inseparability of problems of international security and disarmament from specific regional interests can be traced in the commentary of the journal THE HERALD: "The rapprochement achieved in the sphere of arms reduction should in the long term ease the confrontation of the superpowers in the third world."

The material of the press published in developing countries since the Washington meeting expresses the hope that the first step will be followed by agreements on strategic offensive arms, a ban on chemical weapons, a reduction in conventional arms and a halt to nuclear testing. A number of observers appeals to "third world" countries for assertiveness here. This question is being discussed particularly intensively in India. Thus an editorial article in the NATIONAL HERALD says that "India and other representatives of the Group of Six should in urging nuclear disarmament put pressure on the USSR and the United States for progress to be made at the Geneva negotiations."

The press of the developing countries emphasizes attention to the great work performed by the Soviet Union in the course of the negotiations in Vienna and Geneva and, particularly, in Reykjavik for the achievement of the first practical results and has much to say about the prospects of the new approach to international problems thanks to the initiatives of the USSR and the vigorous efforts of the Soviet leadership. Politicians of the developing world regard the signing of the INF Treaty as "evidence of the success of the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union." The Indian newspaper THE PATRIOT believes that "the USSR's peace policy should dispel NATO fears for its security." The Algerian weekly EL MOUJAHID values highly "the efforts primarily of the Soviet Union in the conclusion of the INF Treaty."

Discussion of the results of the summit between the United States and the USSR in the developing world testifies to the ambivalence of the evaluations of the stabilization of the international situation. In the opinion of a number of countries, disarmament prospects depend to a large extent on the reaction of the European NATO states, which are expressing concern in connection with the asymmetry of the conventional arms potentials in Europe. The measures proposed within the

NATO framework, specifically the deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles within the zone of this organization, are seen as new methods of pressure on the USSR. In the opinion of the TIMES OF INDIA, "it has become obvious since the signing of the INF Treaty that the West European countries were interested in confrontation with the USSR."

A number of leaders of emergent countries calls attention to the fact that the agreement between the United States and the USSR has intensified American-European disagreements on military-political problems and security problems. In the opinion of R. Andriamanjato, member of Madagascar's Supreme Revolutionary Council, "Britain and France must also halt the buildup of their nuclear forces and then proceed to reduce them." Special significance in this connection is attached to the evaluation of the consequences of the conclusion of the treaty for the concept of international security. Two viewpoints have been ascertained on this issue. According to one, "the doctrine of nuclear deterrence" will continue to dominate the strategic plans of the United States, which could complicate considerably efforts to consolidate international and regional security. The other viewpoint is more optimistic and sees the INF Treaty as the first step toward the abandonment of the said doctrine.

The varied appearance and complexity of the developing world is manifested in the evaluation of the results of the Soviet-American meeting specifically for the emergent states. The majority of developing countries evaluates the results of the Washington meeting in the context of the interrelated problems of disarmament and the surmounting of backwardness. Questions of survival and salvation from starvation and want are serious enough for the young independent states. Added to them are problems of foreign debt and the chronic backwardness of the economic structure. Under these conditions the solution of the global problem of development acquires paramount significance for many people in Asian, African and Latin American countries, whereas the threat of a world thermonuclear war is of a nonspecific and therefore remote nature. A failure to understand the growing interdependence of the world continues here. Such ideas are not overcome right away, which has been manifested in certain emergent states' underestimation of the importance of the INF Treaty for development and the surmounting of their backwardness.

The mass media and statesmen and public figures of emergent states are raising the question of the actual consequences of the INF Treaty for solution of the global problem of backwardness. The majority of representatives of the developing world expresses the hope that the Washington agreement will not only lead to complete nuclear disarmament but will also clear the way to the all-around development of all members of the international community, the developing countries included. Many statesmen, Madagascar President D. Ratsiraka,

for example, discern a direct connection between the signing of the agreement and the solution of the problem of their countries' socioeconomic backwardness.

In the light of the priority program of restoration of African countries' economy devised by the OAU and the UN action program for restoration of African states' economy for 1986-1990 the states of this continent express the hope that the resources released in the disarmament process will be used as development assistance. Thus the government newspaper CAMEROON TRIBUNE calls on the leaders of the two powers "to pay special attention to Africa" inasmuch as this continent has been hit by a serious crisis. The paper emphasizes that "a threat to general peace emanates not only from the arms race but also from the existing inequality and injustice in economic relations between states."

Together with positive responses to the signing of the treaty a different interpretation of its consequences for the developing countries has shown through also. The basis of this viewpoint is the conviction as to the exclusively egotistic policy of the two great powers. For this reason the results of the summit are seen not from the viewpoint of their global perspective but through the prism of bilateral relations between the USSR and the United States. It is significant that certain circles of the West also, including the United States itself, are attempting to consolidate this view of certain developing countries.

At the same time the understanding in the developing world of the importance of cooperation between the United States and the USSR and dialogue as an effective path toward the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the settlement of conflict situations and problems common to all mankind is evidence of the new approach. In the opinion of Mexican Foreign Minister B. Sepulveda, the "mutual understanding" reached in Washington "extends to the entire set of international relations and will contribute to the settlement of regional conflicts and constructive negotiations within the UN framework on the question of the relationship of disarmament and development."

A number of comments contains a sober evaluation of the complexity of the problems, whose solution requires time and a new sense of realism in relations between the two major powers. The political leaders of some countries express the confidence that the INF Treaty will contribute to the solution of regional conflicts.

The Indian press contains a considered evaluation of the Washington meeting as an active dialogue on conflict situations. Editorial articles of the central newspapers say that it would be unrealistic to expect from this meeting a settlement of disagreements on the situation involving Afghanistan, Cambodia and Nicaragua and the achievement of accord on human rights issues. But

even these disagreements, the Bombay newspaper FREE PRESS JOURNAL believes, do not detract from the significance of the negotiations in Washington.

Recognizing the importance of the two powers' joint efforts in the solution of regional conflicts, many statesmen and politicians of Asia, Africa and Latin America emphasized attention to the existing disagreements between the USSR and the United States concerning the events surrounding Afghanistan, Cambodia and Nicaragua. Thus in an interview with the newspaper VOZ DI NUOVO the Cape Verde foreign minister noted that "the INF Treaty fails to solve the problem of a settlement of regional conflicts." As the Nigerian NEW NIGERIAN maintained, regional conflicts continue, refuting the aspiration declared by the United States and the USSR "to cultivate the tree of peace". "They are occurring in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Southeast Asia with the use of weapons supplied from the arsenals of the superpowers."

Attempts are encountered in a number of press organs of the developing countries, particularly those in which the regimes are pro-West oriented, to distort Soviet foreign policy, and the invention concerning the USSR's "inflexible position" and its alleged lack of interest in the disarmament process is being fanned. Use is made to the same end of the proposition concerning "the Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia" and the increased assistance to Vietnam and Cambodia. Thus the newspaper THE NATION, which is close to the Thai Foreign Ministry, observed that in connection with the conclusion of the INF Treaty "even greater significance will be attached to the two powers' military facilities in the Asia-Pacific region."

Evaluating the results of the summit, the press organs of Arab countries, primarily Kuwait, refer to the two powers' disagreements in respect of a settlement of the Iran-Iraq and Arab-Israeli conflicts. Proceeding from the principle of equal responsibility, the newspaper Al-Ray al-Amm accuses the United States of an interest in an escalation of the Iran-Iraq conflict, and the USSR is reproached for its unwillingness to impose an embargo on weapons supplies to Iran. According to the Indian newspaper HINDU, the "balance of forces" philosophy is fragile and cannot guarantee the normal development of relations between the United States and the USSR.

One further trend may be traced in the comments on the Washington meeting: a reassessment of values in the "third world" and an understanding of the need for its active participation in the solution of global and international problems. This was discussed, in particular, at the Manila meeting of ASEAN heads of government 14-15 December and at the session of the Council of Eight (meeting of the presidents of eight Latin American countries) who had assembled in Mexico at the end of December 1987. Participants in the nonaligned movement have declared their resolve to support initiatives geared to the achievement of disarmament.

In the opinion of C.A. Perez, deputy chairman of the Socialist International, no countries, however small, must remain passive observers of the process of the gradual elimination of all nuclear arsenals. They are obliged to adopt an active position in the struggle for peace and disarmament. Graphic confirmation of this approach is the activity of the Delhi Six. The convergence of the positions of Argentina, Greece, Tanzania, Sweden, India and Mexico on problems of peace occurred on the basis of an aspiration to a halt to nuclear testing and the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and to a significant reduction in nuclear forces. A message from the Group of Six to M.S. Gorbachev and President Reagan expressed full confidence in and support for the first important step in the disarmament process. These states see as their role and mission the formation of a so-called "third party" contributing to the creation of a climate of trust between the United States and the USSR—the key powers in the disarmament sphere.

The developing countries' reaction to the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan shows that Asian, African and Latin American states, while approving its results as a whole, are mainly concerned not to remain aloof from the positive changes which are gaining momentum in international relations. This approach is in keeping also with the Soviet concept of an all-embracing system of international security providing for the active involvement in its creation of all participants in the world community.

#### Footnotes

\* Survey prepared by the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO Analysis of Current Information Department.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya," 1988.

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#### Prospects for Outcome of Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Talks Weighed

18160008e Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian  
No 4, Apr 88 pp 104-108

[Report by D. Yuryev: "At the Vienna Meeting"]

[Text] What sort of Europe will it be following the Soviet-American INF Treaty? Are "compensation" for the missiles to be removed—this means of considerable importance of "deterrence" policy on the European continent—and, consequently, the continuation here of the customary, military-power methods of ensuring security inevitable or, on the contrary, will the need for political dialogue and the close cooperation of both parts of Europe grow even more? Today, at a pivotal stage in

international relations, these questions are not the subject of abstract reflection in the stillness of offices. The answer to them contains the key to practical policy and the future of all Europeans.

The all-European equation is now being solved in Moscow, in Washington and in the capitals of all European countries. This is the priority task facing the Vienna meeting of representatives of participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which opened in November 1986.

Its fifth round began in January 1988. This is the third forum (after Belgrade in October 1977-March 1978 and Madrid in November 1980-September 1983) designed within the follow-up framework (further steps following the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) to provide for continuation of the all-European process. The particular significance of the meeting is that it got down to business under the conditions of the new time count which began in Reykjavik. Now, when in connection with the signing of the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination immediately of two classes of nuclear weapons, the prospects for an abrupt positive change in all European affairs are becoming increasingly real, the significance of the Vienna meeting is growing immeasurably. It is essential to complete it with results which support the dynamics of disarmament on the continent and bring all-European cooperation in all its dimensions—political, military, economic, ecological, humanitarian—to a qualitatively new level.

#### I

Particular significance since Washington has been attached in the all-European process to **military-political questions of security**. Whereas in Helsinki and subsequently in Madrid and at the Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm specific accords concerned mainly confidence-building measures in the military sphere, the question not only of the continued development of such measures but of a transition to an actual reduction in armed forces and conventional arms on a European scale is being tackled in Vienna. This task is fully in keeping with the Helsinki Final Act, which emphasized the interest of all participants in efforts aimed at a lessening of military confrontation and the promotion of disarmament. The summary document of the Madrid meeting contains an appeal for "the gradual implementation of new, effective and specific actions aimed at developing progress in confidence-building and security and in the achievement of disarmament."

In the course of the first rounds even the Warsaw Pact states opposed the attempts of the United States and its closest allies to take disarmament problems outside of the framework of the all-European process. They made the basis of their line a two-in-one approach: further elaboration of confidence-building and security measures and the start of negotiations on a reduction in

armed forces and conventional arms from the Atlantic to the Urals. The work should thus be performed in two parallel, but contiguous directions and within the framework, what is more—and this is of fundamental importance—of the common all-European process and with regard for the interests of the security of all its participants.

It is around these questions that a tense struggle has developed both at the meeting itself and in the course of the consultations which began within its framework in February 1987 of the representatives of the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO states on questions connected with the formulation of the mandate of future negotiations on a reduction in armed forces and arms in Europe. As a result it has been possible not only to preserve but also appreciably strengthen the military-political parameters of the all-European process. The question of the Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and Disarmament in Europe continuing in 1988 and negotiations on a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms on the continent starting in parallel in the event of the successful completion of the Vienna meeting has in practice been decided in advance.

There has been certain progress in the work on the mandate of the future negotiations on conventional arms conducted in the Group of 23: the general political goals of the negotiations and ways to achieve them have been preliminarily agreed. The strengthening of stability and security in Europe by way of the establishment of a balance of armed forces and conventional arms at lower levels and the elimination of inequality and also the potential for a surprise attack and the start of large-scale offensive operations is to be such a goal. The idea of mutual and appreciable reductions in military potentials has been reflected in agreed propositions. It is envisaged that the goals of the negotiations will be achieved by the application of such militarily significant measures as reductions, limitations, equal ceilings and so forth.

However, much has still to be done to bring the positions of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries closer on such key components of the mandate as the subject of the impending negotiations, the zone and verification.

The biggest difficulties are associated with the problem of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. From the very outset the USSR and the other socialist countries advocated questions of a reduction in conventional arms being tackled in a complex with tactical nuclear missiles, tactical strike aircraft, nuclear artillery and other tactical nuclear weapons, the majority of which are dual-capable weapons, that is, may carry both conventional and nuclear warheads. Subsequently the Warsaw Pact states submitted a compromise formula according to which armed forces and conventional arms, including dual-capable weapons on land, were to be the subject of the negotiations. In the course of the negotiations here the

states concerned would examine all questions pertaining to the set of problems associated with a limitation of and reduction in tactical nuclear weapons.

NATO is, as before, categorically opposed to the incorporation in the subject of the negotiations of both tactical nuclear weapons as such and dual-capable weapons, although in accordance with the classification accepted in the majority of Western countries (in Britain, Belgium and the FRG, for example) dual-capable weapons are a part of conventional arms.

Yet the need for a reduction precisely in dual-capable weapons as the most dangerous, destabilizing types of arms becomes even more paramount in connection with the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the plans being drawn up in NATO to "compensate" for the American nuclear missiles in Europe which are due to be eliminated.

Speaking in Bonn on 18 January 1988, E.A. Shevardnadze put forward a new version of a solution of the problem of tactical nuclear weapons. It is proposed starting from the future negotiations on a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe examining the question of dual-capable delivery systems (tactical missiles, heavy artillery, tactical strike aircraft and so forth). The nuclear component of such weapons itself (nuclear warheads, projectiles, aerial bombs), on the other hand, could be made the subject of corresponding negotiations in the future, this matter not being put on the back burner, however.

In not consenting to an examination in the immediate future of the question of a reduction in tactical nuclear weapons, in which, incidentally, as NATO maintains, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries are allegedly superior, the West is once again revealing its fanatical devotion to the clichés and canons of "nuclear deterrence" strategy and the "flexible response" concept, the groundlessness of which has been shown fully in the nuclear-space era, which requires not military-power but new political thinking.

It is also of fundamental importance that the reductions in armed forces and conventional arms and the equalization (but not by way of an increase) of the existing imbalances and asymmetries in terms of their individual components be carried out on the basis of reciprocity. As M.S. Gorbachev declared at the press conference in Washington, the negotiations will be meaningful if it is a question of the reciprocal and simultaneous reduction and removal of imbalances and asymmetries. Only thus can generally acceptable solutions which do not infringe the security interests of either party or of any state be found.

The question of the content of the further work of the Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and Disarmament in Europe remains pertinent and



largely unsolved. Whereas the NATO countries are putting the emphasis on a broadening of the exchange of information on the structure and deployment of armed forces and the development of the system of on-site inspection, the Warsaw Pact states are counterposing to this a broader approach corresponding to the spirit of the times (and the summary document of the Madrid meeting). It should be a question of the elaboration of confidence-building measures in respect of which consent was not reached at the Stockholm Conference or which might be advanced in the future. These are a gradual reduction in military activity, particularly of the two military alliances, notification of independent air and naval exercises, the envelopment by confidence-building measures of the territory of all participants in the All-European Conference and also other confidence-building and security measures. Measures of confidence building and military-strategic stability in Europe directly associated with a reduction in armed forces, conventional arms and military spending, which are new in nature and which would facilitate the achievement of agreements and lead to the establishment of military balance at the lowest possible level, would be a subject of study simultaneously also.

A particular feature of the all-European process is the active participation of neutral and nonaligned countries in the molding of the military-political dimension of security on the continent. Their substantial contribution to the work of the Stockholm Conference is well known. However, the stubborn attempts of the United States and its closest NATO allies to shove aside the neutrals—and these constitute one-third of the participants in the all-European process—from the discussion of questions of disarmament on the continent have been encountered at the Vienna meeting.

The Soviet Union believes that although the future negotiations will initially concern mutual reductions in the armed forces of countries which are members of military-political alliances, it is essential to provide for the possibility of the association therewith of other European states also. Real mutual linkage—both in form and in content—between the negotiations on conventional arms and the Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and Disarmament in Europe is needed. This would make it possible to take account of the security interests of neutral and nonaligned states and enable them to have their say on issues concerning the future of all of Europe.

The joint statement of M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan on the results of the Washington meeting speak of the need for the completion of the work in Vienna on the mandate of the negotiations concerning a lowering of the military confrontation in Europe in the sphere of armed forces and conventional arms in order in the immediate future to begin negotiations in earnest for the purpose of the formulation of specific solutions. The importance of

the continuation and extension of the process begun by the Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and Disarmament in Europe was emphasized also.

## II

A particular feature of the Vienna meeting has been the increased attention to questions of a broadening of cooperation in the field of **economics, the ecology, science and technology**. This is a kind of economic guarantee of peace and economic dimension of security. A broad understanding of the need for big new steps which will suffice the "second basket" with content in keeping with the present demands of S&T progress and the requirements of nations' economic rapprochement has ripened.

The question of the holding after Vienna of three large-scale all-European forums on the ecology, economics and science and technology was raised. We would recall that hitherto only meetings of experts on individual aspects of the problems have been held—a scientific forum in Hamburg (1980) and two meetings on economic, scientific and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean (1979 and 1984). Proposals which echo one another to a large extent from Czechoslovakia on an economic forum, and the FRG, on a conference on economic cooperation, initiatives from Bulgaria on an ecological forum, and from the northern countries, on a meeting on questions of ecology within the UN Economic Commission for Europe framework, Italy's idea concerning a scientific forum and Romania's proposal concerning an S&T cooperation conference have now appeared.

Discussion is now under way on the possible coupling and linkage of these proposals and, what is most important, on the content of the work of such all-European meetings. It is essential to get past the expert analysis phases and pose problems on a large scale and with a view to the future. It was in this key that Czechoslovakia submitted in October 1987 addenda to its proposal, specifying the main directions of trade and industrial cooperation and incorporating therein a number of questions contained in the FRG's proposal. Italy's initiative on the holding of a scientific forum would appear more attractive were its mandate based on a broad approach to questions of S&T cooperation.

However, future forums are a definite prospect, albeit of the next few years. It is no less important that specific arrangements advancing economic relations on an all-European scale have already been agreed in Vienna. Whereas in Belgrade and Madrid few proposals were submitted in this connection and even fewer were agreed, approximately 50 initiatives of a foreign economic nature—one-third of all those submitted at the Vienna meeting—are being discussed currently.



The formulation by many Western countries of the question of an expansion of the exchange of economic and commercial information, an improvement in businessmen's conditions of activity and the development of business contacts, including those between suppliers and consumers of imported products and medium-sized and small enterprises, for example, is natural. The socialist countries, in turn, are making the focus of attention the more efficient introduction in all-European practice of promising forms of cooperation such as joint ventures, production cooperation, industrial and S&T cooperation, compensation deals and advanced technology exchange. Unfortunately, many of these proposals are encountering the guarded and, at times, negative attitude of Western partners. The United States, for example, is once again calling in question the effectiveness of economic relations on a compensation basis and is sharply opposed to technology exchange. The prohibitive spirit of CoCom, which has long been a serious impediment to the development of mutually profitable relations with the socialist states, still prevails over many Western delegations.

Although the policy of economic sanctions and embargoes, discrimination and the arbitrary abandonment of deals and agreements which have been concluded long since revealed its groundlessness, the delegations of the United States and many of its allies are, as before, objecting to the inclusion in the summary document of the Vienna meeting of provisions aimed at the removal of obstacles and limitations in East-West trade and the elimination of artificial barriers, without which states' genuine economic security is impossible.

The abandonment of hackneyed stereotypes of thinking and action is essential for a breakthrough to be made in problems of the "second basket" as in the military-political sphere.

### III

New approaches, a fresh, unblinkered view and movement toward meeting one another half-way are necessary not least in such a sphere of relations between states as the **humanitarian** sphere. After all, detente in Europe will be judged not only by the quantity of missiles withdrawn from the nuclear arsenals. The parameters of detente are also contacts between people, cooperation in the sphere of culture, information and education and basic rights and liberties of the individual. In other words, they are what constitutes the human aspect, the human dimension of the Final Act. It is in this sphere that the moral and ethical guarantees of security may be created and the potential of trust and cooperation largely realized. But it is this complicated sphere, directly associated with ideological contradictions and, it has to be admitted, already poisoned to a considerable extent by mutual mistrust, which is frequently a source of confrontation, in questions of military detente included.

Advancing in November 1986 the idea of the convening in Moscow of a representative conference on the development of humanitarian cooperation, the Soviet Union proceeded from the fact that the time was ripe for a candid businesslike East-West discussion on the entire set of these problems, a discussion oriented, what is more, toward practical results.

The Western partners, which for a long time avoided discussion of the Soviet proposal, posed the question of the plane in which discussions could proceed and requested the decoding and clarification of the idea of the conference. The addenda which the USSR submitted in July 1987 and the readiness to make the basis of the agenda a widening of humanitarian cooperation in the context of the "human dimension" of the Helsinki process markedly increased interest in the proposed forum. Confirmation of the intention to be guided in the organization of the conference by the practice and standards which had taken shape within the framework of the All-European Conference and open the plenary sessions of the conference to the press and the public met with a positive response.

The idea of the "human dimension" as applied to the all-European process may be interpreted variously. Of course, the most dependable and promising path is to remain on the firm ground of the Final Act. In other words, human rights need to be discussed in full, as recorded in principle VII of the Helsinki document. We are ready to compare the state of affairs in the field of observance of human rights with us and in the West, describe what is happening in our country and see how these problems are being tackled—and if they are being tackled—in other countries. There should be no "constricted" interpretation of the human rights problem. A serious approach presupposes an examination thereof comprehensively, including questions of political and economic lack of rights, a variety of instances of discrimination, unemployment, homelessness, hunger and so forth. After all, these questions concern not individuals but millions of people. But such a comparison is not an end in itself but rather a means, if, of course, it is not a question of confrontation. The purpose should be the encouragement and development of cooperation between states in the efficient exercise of civic, political, economic, social, cultural and other individual rights and liberties.

Or take contacts between people. Here also the Helsinki accords point in the direction not of a selective but comprehensive approach. Of course, it would be pointless to deny the need for the solution in a humane and positive spirit of such questions as, for example, the reunification of families, marriage and so forth. But is everything auspicious, for example, in the sphere of relations between establishments and organizations? Are not the barriers which are lowered from time to time in the West before union delegations, scientific figures and athletes from the socialist countries not impeding free contacts between people?

The USSR's proposal concerning the convening in Moscow of a conference on humanitarian issues has been supported by all the socialist countries and is encountering growing understanding on the part of a number of neutral and nonaligned countries and certain medium-sized and small NATO countries. However, as a whole, Western states are as yet refraining from officially setting forth their position and putting forward a variety of prior conditions, which concern both the essence of the conference's subject matter, its agenda and questions of access thereto of so-called human rights defense groups and individuals and its correlation with other all-European forums in the field of human rights and humanitarian cooperation.

Of course, the Soviet proposal does not preclude the possibility of other measures in individual areas of humanitarian problems. Thus Great Britain and also neutral countries have submitted proposals concerning the convening of an information forum, Poland, on a cultural heritage symposium, and France, on the organization in Paris in 1989 of a conference on the bicentennial of the Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the Great French Revolution.

It will be necessary in Vienna to coordinate and record in the summary document a whole number of specific steps pertaining to progress in the sphere of realization of human rights and humanitarian cooperation. However, many Western countries have yet to abandon attempts to reduce the whole set of problems to questions of entrances and exits, the reunification of families, contacts between believers and so forth. A number of their proposals in fact runs counter to the right of states recorded in the Helsinki Act to determine their own laws and administrative rules. Their realization would require, for example, legally unrestricted freedom to emigrate, cancellation of entry visas and passports, the granting of the so-called human rights defense groups the right to monitor compliance with the Helsinki accords and so forth.

At the same time, however, the West is avoiding in every possible way the assumption of commitments pertaining to the realization of man's social and economic rights and failing to adopt the socialist countries' proposals on the development of contacts between working people's mass organizations—unions and youth and women's organizations—on a reduction in the time taken to issue entry visas, guaranteed safety and normal conditions for the participants in cultural, sports and other exchanges and on an increase in the efficacy of intergovernmental agreements on these issues.

The question of negotiating the creation of a particular mechanism of states' interaction on human rights and humanitarian matters has become a central issue in Vienna. The NATO countries submitted a proposal in this connection essentially endowing such a mechanism with supranational monitoring functions. For example, they propose that any participant in the All-European

Conference be accorded the right to automatically convene the All-European Conference to examine and resolve humanitarian cases and situations in one country.

Rejecting this demand as contrary to the Final Act and infringing states' sovereignty, the socialist countries proposed instead of the monitoring mechanism the creation of a consultation and cooperation mechanism, the practical introduction of an exchange of information between the participants on human rights and humanitarian cooperation and bilateral meetings of experts to study questions of human rights and other humanitarian problems for the purpose of finding mutually acceptable ways and means of their solution in a benevolent and humane spirit, granted, of course, observance of states' sovereign rights and in conformity with their international obligations. Such practice has been taking shape and operating successfully in recent years in, for example, the USSR's relations with the United States, France, Great Britain and other countries.

For the increased efficiency of interaction in the humanitarian field the socialist states proposed that the Western countries which have yet to do so ratify the international human rights pacts and other fundamental documents in this sphere and increase their participation in UN human rights bodies.

There should be no stagnation in the humanitarian nor in other areas of the all-European process, and agreements should be sought constantly. It is necessary to view in unison and without prejudice the entire set of humanitarian problems through the prism of honest cooperation, and not confrontation.

The Vienna meeting of representatives of participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has come really close to a critical frontier—the adoption of political decisions in all areas of the further development of the all-European process and thereby the entire set of East-West relations. The fruitful conclusion of the Vienna meeting will depend on the political will and constructive actions of all participants and their desire and capacity for taking advantage of the change which has been marked in the international atmosphere by the top-level Soviet-American agreements in Washington. It is essential to continue to expand and consolidate the areas of agreement on key issues which are beginning to show through in Vienna, displaying realism and a high sense of responsibility. The Vienna meeting, to whose success the Soviet Union intends to continue actively contributing, can and should be one further good example of the fruitfulness of the new thinking in the affairs of Europe and the whole world community and in the building of the "all-European house".

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya," 1988

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### Development Potential of Soviet-FRG Relations Seen

18160008f Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 4, Apr 88 pp 150-151

[L. Severyanin review: "Resources of Partnership"]

[Text] The thaw in the international climate which has come about since the signing of the Soviet-American INF Treaty has prompted hopes of an improvement in the relations of our country and the whole socialist community with West European states also. For many reasons a kind of key part here is played by the Soviet Union's relations with the FRG. Their development has in recent years been extremely contradictory, making an evaluation of both their general state and, particularly, their possible prospects a scientific task of considerable complexity.

The work in question\* attempts to provide an integral picture of Soviet-West German relations over a decade approximately. The analysis begins from the time when these relations, having experienced the salutary stimuli of the detente of the start of the 1970's and entering into a normal channel for the first time since the war under their impact, then began to fall under the influence of inauspicious factors, primarily U.S. administrations' policy of securing the United States' strategic superiority to the socialist world.

F. Novik shows convincingly and with a large amount of documentary material that Washington's deliberate exacerbation of the confrontation with the USSR, its adding of new spirals to the arms race, with the enlistment therein of bloc allies, the transition to production of the components of neutron weapons and the attempts to deploy them in West Europe (1976-1978), the creation of "Euromissiles" and their deployment on the continent, primarily in the FRG, as of the fall of 1983—all this, given Bonn's "exemplary" Atlantic discipline, could not have failed to have caused a deterioration in its relations with the East (pp 92-105).

The said negative process, which became far advanced under the SPD-FDP social-liberal coalition government even, intensified following the return to power in the country in the fall of 1982 of conservative forces headed by the CDU/CSU. The book rightly observes that the new government not only rendered militarist circles additional services but also permitted the revival of a revanchist trend, which had weakened somewhat in the detente period of the end of the 1960's-start of the 1970's. The logical outcome was an abrupt cooling of the very climate of relations with the USSR and other socialist countries (pp 119-146).

The author, however, does not confine herself to affirmation of this regrettable circumstance. She highlights another, no less important aspect—the fact that even in a period of the exacerbation of the overall situation and under the conditions of the severely poisoned international atmosphere in bilateral relations significant and viable enclaves of detente persisted; mutually profitable constructive cooperation continued to develop and expand even between the two countries in a number of areas. This applies primarily to the economic and S&T spheres, which are carefully analyzed in the monograph (pp 149-201) and also contacts in the cultural field (pp 202-224).

Political frosts fettered the dynamics of Soviet-West German trade and caused a number of interruptions in traditional cultural relations, which had begun to revive as of the end of the 1960's. Nonetheless, the foundations of cooperation stood. The lowering of the intensity of overall tension which is beginning to show is making it possible to hope for the removal of the artificial barriers in the relationship between the two countries.

But to return to the book. Unfortunately, it fails to provide a clear idea of the nature and correlation of the factors operating in the FRG itself for or, on the contrary, against an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. Nothing specific is said about the forces and political groupings accepting or rejecting the new thinking in foreign policy. The domestic policy struggle concerning relations with the USSR has for some reason escaped the scholar's field of vision. The positions and activity of the participants in the peace movement are not illustrated and events associated with the antimissile campaign are not studied (if only cursorily).

It is difficult to agree with the fact that in the explanation of the disruptions in Soviet-West German relations everything in fact boils down merely to outside pressure on the FRG on the part of the senior transatlantic partner (see, for example, p 226). Far from everywhere does the work consider to the proper extent the potential of the opponents of detente in West Germany itself. The state of affairs in the social-liberal coalition is from this viewpoint somewhat embellished, we believe. Throughout the latter's 13-year term in office, F. Novik maintains, "a policy of the development of relations with the socialist countries was predominant, as a whole" (p 225). It would seem to us that a differentiated approach would have been more appropriate here: as of the end of the 1970's there had been increased pressure in the coalition itself, particularly on the part of the FDP leaders, from forces gravitating toward "toughness" in respect of the socialist countries, as a result of which the government itself to a large extent retreated from the principles of its Ostpolitik.

The said points indicate a certain incompleteness of the author's observations and analysis and the insufficient precision of some of the conclusions drawn in the book.

However, a true, informative and fact-full picture of Soviet-West German relations has been provided as a whole, persuading us that their development potential is far from exhausted.

#### Footnotes

\*F.I. Novik, "SSSR-FRG: problemy sosushchestvovaniya i sotrudnichestva. 1975-1986" [USSR-FRG: Problems of Coexistence and Cooperation. 1975-1986], Moscow, "Nauka," 1987, 246pp.

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#### News of IMEMO Activities

18160008g Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 88 pp 156-157

[Text] Topical tasks of scientists and journalists in the field of scientific research and journalistic illustration of problems of the development of the emergent countries was the subject of a seminar-conference held in the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO on 1 March.

The meeting of employees of Soviet research institutions and the mass media was opened by CPSU Central Committee executive N.V. Shishlin. Opening remarks to its participants were addressed by Academician Ye.M. Primakov, director of the IMEMO. He described in basic outline the current situation which has come about in the so-called "third world" and dwelt briefly on the priority directions and singularities of the present stage of research in the field of the economics and politics of the young independent states. There was particular emphasis of the need for serious reconsideration within the new thinking framework of the role and place of this group of countries in the modern world and the prospects and specific features of their development and the abandonment of certain stereotypes and cliches which had taken firm hold in the past.

In the course of the exchange of opinions those assembled expressed a number of considerations concerning the ways and means of enhancing the quality of the research and journalistic material pertaining to the problems in question and further improving work relationships and coordination in the activity of the research institutions and the mass media and scientists and journalists. Thus mention was made of the expediency of the more thorough study and correct illustration of the complex processes of differentiation of the emergent countries and the consideration in full in each specific instance of actual conditions and circumstances and accumulated economic and political experience. It was the general opinion that what is needed today is a serious, comprehensive analysis primarily of the as yet

little-studied serious problems of the "third world" which are "difficult" for journalistic illustration, a policy of the emphatic elimination of the "blanks" which exist here and so forth. An honest, truthful, objective and factologically accurate illustration of the actual state of affairs and an end to so-called "prohibited topics"—such is the demand of the times.

Taking part in the discussion of the issues raised were the prominent social scientists A.M. Vasilyev, N.G. Zaytsev, I.N. Zorina, N.A. Karagodin, A.K. Kislov, V.A. Kremenyuk, G.B. Starushenko, V.G. Khoros, G.I. Chufurin and G.K. Shirokov, the well-known journalists and press officials I.P. Belyayev (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA), A.Ye. Bovin (IZVESTIYA), A.V. Nikiforov (SShA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA), Vs.V. Ovchinnikov (PRAVDA), F.M. Seyful-Mulyukov (USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting), A.F. Smirnov (Novosti) and V.K. Turadzhev (AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA) and a number of other scholars and journalists.

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"State-Monopoly Regulation of the Food Industry and the Foreign Economic Relations of Agrobusiness" was the agenda of an international symposium and meeting of the Working Group on Agrarian Problems of the Developed Capitalist Countries of the Multilateral Cooperation Problem-Solving Commission of the socialist states' academies of sciences on the subject "Study of Present-Day Capitalism" which were held 25-30 January in the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO. Specialists and representatives of Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the USSR took part.

The papers, speeches and debates broached such questions as the significance, forms and methods of state regulation of the food industry and the exacerbation of the problem of the sale of agricultural and food products on foreign markets as a result of the pursuit by a number of capitalist countries and groupings thereof of a protectionist agrarian policy and the growth in this connection of interimperialist contradictions on the world food market. Considerable attention was paid to the impact of the TNC and other capitalist firms and agricultural cooperatives on the development of bourgeois states' food industry and the foreign economic relations of the food complex.

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The institute was visited in January by Hans-Juergen (Kris), leader of West Berlin's "For European Cooperation" political club, who was in the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. The guest met and had talks with Prof V.N. Shenayev, doctor of economic sciences, and the associates of the Center for West European Studies. Questions of East-West multilateral cooperation, the connection between perestroika in the USSR and the increased

efficiency of mutual contacts in the economic sphere, West Berlin's current position and the prospects of FRG-GDR bilateral relations were discussed, inter alia. H.-J. (Kris) described the work of the political club's Economic Security Department and emphasized its leadership's interest in an expansion of scientific relations with representatives of the USSR.

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A meeting was held between IMEMO scholars (Doctor of Historical Sciences A.G. Arbatov, Doctor of Historical Sciences V.G. Baranovskiy and others) and guests from the United States. The group included (I. Spalatin) and J. Wright, staffers of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Arms Control, International Security and Science Subcommittee, and Republican Party advisers on this committee W. (Igli) and W. (Fayt). Questions were broached in the course of the discussion connected with further prospects of the disarmament process and guaranteed stability against the background of a strategic arms reduction, the importance of the development and introduction of principles and categories of the new political thinking in the nuclear-space age and the development of Soviet-American relations.

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The IMEMO was visited by S. Quinn-Judge, an American journalist who was for many years a correspondent of the weekly FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW. In the course of the discussion with associates of the institute the guest obtained answers to a number of questions of interest to her connected with the nature and particular features of Soviet specialists' study of problems of the Asia-Pacific region. She was familiarized in detail with the structure and tasks of the institute and the work of the Pacific Studies Department and expressed some of her own thoughts and opinions concerning the situation and processes in Southeast Asian countries.

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